Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund, issuing body.
IMF Institute, issuing body.
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| ISBN: | 1451918798
9781451918793
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 33-35).
English.
Print version record.
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| Summary: | In this paper I study the effect of imperfect central bank commitment on inflationary outcomes. I present a model in which the monetary authority is a committee that consists of members who serve overlapping, finite terms. Older and younger generations of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members decide on policy by engaging in a bargaining process. I show that this setup gives rise to a continuous measure of the degree of monetary authority's commitment. The model suggests that the lower the churning rate or the longer the tenure time, the closer social welfare will be to that under optimal commitment policy.
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| Other form: | Print version: Shamloo, Maral. Optimal monetary policy with overlapping generations of policymakers. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2010
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