Risk and the corporate structure of banks /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, author.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2010.
Description:1 online resource (25 pages).
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/10/40
IMF working paper ; WP/10/40.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498402
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Other authors / contributors:Marquez, Robert, 1968- author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
ISBN:1283561395
9781283561396
9781451962901
1451962908
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-25).
Print version record.
Summary:We identify different sources of risk as important determinants of banks' corporate structures when expanding into new markets. Subsidiary-based corporate structures benefit from greater protection against economic risk because of affiliate-level limited liability, but are more exposed to the risk of capital expropriation than are branches. Thus, branch-based structures are preferred to subsidiary-based structures when expropriation risk is high relative to economic risk, and vice versa. Greater cross-country risk correlation and more accurate pricing of risk by investors reduce the differences between the two structures. Furthermore, the corporate structure affects bank risk taking and affiliate size.
Other form:Print version: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni. Risk and the corporate structure of banks. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2010