Revenue forecasts as performance targets /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Danninger, Stephan.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affair Dept., 2005.
Description:1 online resource (20 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/05/14
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498420
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department.
ISBN:128206116X
9781282061163
9781451905694
1451905696
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 19-20).
Print version record.
Summary:Budget revenue forecasts should be best estimates of expected receipts. Often they are not. This paper analyzes the rationale for overstated revenue forecasts and derives conditions for intentional biases. A theoretical model demonstrates that overstated revenue forecasts can be the result of the government's attempt to boost unobserved revenue collection effort. If positive forecast errors are costly and undermine public credibility of budget expenditure plans, the reverse outcome is possible and governments may understate revenue forecasts. A case study for Azerbaijan is presented in support of the former incentive motive.

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Revenue forecasts as performance targets /  |c prepared by Stephan Danniger. 
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520 3 |a Budget revenue forecasts should be best estimates of expected receipts. Often they are not. This paper analyzes the rationale for overstated revenue forecasts and derives conditions for intentional biases. A theoretical model demonstrates that overstated revenue forecasts can be the result of the government's attempt to boost unobserved revenue collection effort. If positive forecast errors are costly and undermine public credibility of budget expenditure plans, the reverse outcome is possible and governments may understate revenue forecasts. A case study for Azerbaijan is presented in support of the former incentive motive. 
650 0 |a Fiscal policy  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Tax revenue estimating  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Politique fiscale  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Recettes fiscales  |x Estimation  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Fiscal policy  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00925810 
650 7 |a Tax revenue estimating  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01143854 
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