Labor and product market deregulation : partial, sequential, or simultaneous reform? /

Labor and product market deregulation : partial, sequential, or simultaneous reform? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Berger, Helge, author.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, European Department, ©2005.
Description:	1 online resource (33 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/05/227 IMF working paper ; WP/05/227.
Subject:	Labor market -- Econometric models. Employment (Economic theory) -- Econometric models. Employment (Economic theory) -- Econometric models. Labor market -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498449

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Danninger, Stephan, author. International Monetary Fund. European Department, issuing body.
ISBN:	1283515253 9781283515252 9781451907827 1451907826 1462359914 9781462359912 1451991398 9781451991390 9786613827708 6613827703
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references. English. Print version record.
Summary:	This study explores the effects of labor and product market deregulation on employment growth. Our empirical results, based on an OECD country panel from 1990-2004, suggest that lower levels of product and labor market regulation foster employment growth, including through sizable interaction effects. Based on these findings, the paper develops a theoretical framework for evaluating deregulation strategies in the presence of reform costs. Optimal deregulation takes various forms depending on the deregulation costs, the strength of reform interactions, and the perspective of the policymaker. Unless deregulation costs are very asymmetric across markets, optimal deregulation requires some form of coordination.
Other form:	Print version: Berger, Helge. Labor and product market deregulation. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, European Dept., ©2005

Table of Contents:

Contents
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF REGULATION
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Appendix: Illustrating the Interaction Effect
References