The effectiveness of macroeconomic commitment in weak(er) institutional environments /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Gollwitzer, Sophia, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2010.
Description:1 online resource (58 pages) : color illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/10/193
IMF working paper ; WP/10/193.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498670
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Quintyn, Marc, author.
IMF Institute, issuing body.
ISBN:1455204390
9781455204397
1282847392
9781282847392
9781455221318
1455221317
9781455205233
1455205230
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Print version record.
Summary:This paper analyzes the institutional conditions affecting the establishment and effectiveness of independent central banks and of budgetary institutions. It draws on the recent theory developed by North, Wallis and Weingast on the transition from a closed and fragile state to an open economic and political environment. The paper presents a composite indicator allowing for the identification of a country's position along this transition path. The findings suggest that (i) while the establishment of autonomous central banks seems to be relatively independent from the broader institutional framework, sound budgetary institutions tend to be established in countries with higher levels of rule of law for the elites, and (ii) while central bank independence is effective in reducing inflation irrespective of a country's position along the transition path, budget institutions seem to be most effective as a disciplining device in weak institutional environments.
Other form:Print version: Quintyn, Marc. Effectiveness of Macroeconomic Commitment in Weak(er) Institutional Environments. Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2010 9781455205233
Description
Summary:This paper analyzes the institutional conditions affecting the establishment and effectiveness of independent central banks and of budgetary institutions. It draws on the recent theory developed by North, Wallis and Weingast on the transition from a closed and fragile state to an open economic and political environment. The paper presents a composite indicator allowing for the identification of a country's position along this transition path. The findings suggest that (i) while the establishment of autonomous central banks seems to be relatively independent from the broader institutional framework, sound budgetary institutions tend to be established in countries with higher levels of rule of law for the elites, and (ii) while central bank independence is effective in reducing inflation irrespective of a country's position along the transition path, budget institutions seem to be most effective as a disciplining device in weak institutional environments.
Physical Description:1 online resource (58 pages) : color illustrations
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN:1455204390
9781455204397
1282847392
9781282847392
9781455221318
1455221317
9781455205233
1455205230