The effectiveness of macroeconomic commitment in weak(er) institutional environments /

The effectiveness of macroeconomic commitment in weak(er) institutional environments /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Gollwitzer, Sophia, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2010.
Description:1 online resource (58 pages) : color illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/10/193
IMF working paper ; WP/10/193.
Subject:
Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models.
Monetary policy -- Econometric models.
Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models.
Monetary policy -- Econometric models.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498670
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Quintyn, Marc, author.
IMF Institute, issuing body.
ISBN:1455204390
9781455204397
1282847392
9781282847392
9781455221318
1455221317
9781455205233
1455205230
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Print version record.
Summary:This paper analyzes the institutional conditions affecting the establishment and effectiveness of independent central banks and of budgetary institutions. It draws on the recent theory developed by North, Wallis and Weingast on the transition from a closed and fragile state to an open economic and political environment. The paper presents a composite indicator allowing for the identification of a country's position along this transition path. The findings suggest that (i) while the establishment of autonomous central banks seems to be relatively independent from the broader institutional framework, sound budgetary institutions tend to be established in countries with higher levels of rule of law for the elites, and (ii) while central bank independence is effective in reducing inflation irrespective of a country's position along the transition path, budget institutions seem to be most effective as a disciplining device in weak institutional environments.
Other form:Print version: Quintyn, Marc. Effectiveness of Macroeconomic Commitment in Weak(er) Institutional Environments. Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2010 9781455205233
Table of Contents:
  • Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; Appendix Tables; Boxes; Tables; Figures; A. Central Bank Independence; B. Budget Institutions; C. The Institutional Framework in Developing Countries; 1: NWW's Limited-and Open-Access Orders and the Transition; A. Doorsteps and the Establishment of MCI; B. Doorsteps and the Effectiveness of MCI; A. First Doorstep: The Rule of Law for Elites; 1: Components of the First Doorstep; B. Second Doorstep: Perpetual Forms of Organizations; 2: Components of the Second Doorstep; C. Third Doorstep: Political Control of the Military.
  • 3: Components of the Third DoorstepD. Aggregation of the Index; 1: Country Rankings and Doorsteps: D1; 2: Country Rankings Under Doorsteps: D2; 3: Country Rankings Under Doorsteps: D3; 2: The Performance of Mauritius, Tanzania, and Chad under the Doorsteps; A. Descriptive Statistics; 4: Spearman Rank Correlations among Sub-Indices; 5: Average Index Values per Income Group; 4: Overall Doorsteps and CBI; 5: D1 and CBI; 6: D2 and CBI; 7: D3 and CBI; 8: Overall Doorsteps and BI; 9: D1 and BI; 10: D2 and BI; 11: D3 and BI; B. Econometric Analysis; Doorsteps and the Quality of MCI.
  • 6: Doorsteps and CBI7: Doorsteps and the Budget Index; Doorsteps and the Impact of MCI; 8: Doorsteps and the impact of CBI; 9: Split Samples-The Impact of CBI on Inflation with low D1; 10: Split Samples-The Impact of CBI on Inflation with High D1; 12: The Effectiveness of CBI for Low D1 (a through e); 13: Split Samples-The Impact of BI on PED with Low D; 13.a: Marginal Effect of BI on PED (varying D1); 13.b: Marginal Effect of BI on PED (varying D1D2); 13.c: Marginal Effect of BI on PED (varying D1D2D3); 14: Split Samples-The Impact of BI on PED with High D1.
  • 14: The Effectiveness of BI for Low D1 (a through e)Caveats and Robustness Checks; 11: Doorstep and the Impact of BI; 12: Interactions between Doorsteps and Budget Index; I: Databases Used for the Construction of the Doorsteps Index; II: Arnone (2007) CBI Index Scores Updated for 2009; III: Dabla Norris et al. (2010) BI Index Scores; IV: Description of Variables; Reference; VI. Conclusion; V. Empirical Analysis; IV. A Composite Indicator of Doorstep Conditions; III. New Contribution and Theory; II. Literature; I. Introduction; Footnotes.

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