Monitoring and commitment in bank lending behavior /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Blavy, Rodolphe, author.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Dept., 2005.
Description:1 online resource (32 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/05/222
IMF working paper ; WP/05/222.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498717
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Department, issuing body.
ISBN:1283518147
9781283518147
9781451907773
145190777X
1462343767
9781462343768
145278244X
9781452782447
9786613830593
6613830593
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
English.
Print version record.
Summary:The paper proposes a theoretical argument on the nature of bank lending, based on the idea that, through commitment and monitoring, banks overcome basic informational asymmetries with borrowers. By bringing together loan commitment theories and credit rationing theories, the paper shows that, within a framework of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers and under costly termination of lending arrangements, commitment may explain the accumulation of nonperforming loans by banks. Two additional results follow: (i) that banks favor borrowers with well-known production functions and long-term credit history; and (ii) that interest rate spreads may be large if significant market imperfections prevail.
Other form:Print version: Blavy, Rodolphe. Monitoring and commitment in bank lending behavior. [Washington, D.C] : International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Dept., 2005

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100 1 |a Blavy, Rodolphe,  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2001094802 
245 1 0 |a Monitoring and commitment in bank lending behavior /  |c Rodolphe Blavy. 
260 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Dept.,  |c 2005. 
300 |a 1 online resource (32 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/05/222 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
520 |a The paper proposes a theoretical argument on the nature of bank lending, based on the idea that, through commitment and monitoring, banks overcome basic informational asymmetries with borrowers. By bringing together loan commitment theories and credit rationing theories, the paper shows that, within a framework of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers and under costly termination of lending arrangements, commitment may explain the accumulation of nonperforming loans by banks. Two additional results follow: (i) that banks favor borrowers with well-known production functions and long-term credit history; and (ii) that interest rate spreads may be large if significant market imperfections prevail. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
505 0 |a Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK -- III. MONITORING AND BANK LENDING -- IV. TERMINATION COSTS AND COMMITMENT IN BANK LENDING -- V. MONITORING AND COMMITMENT WITH CREDIT HISTORY -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- Appendix. Implicit Commitment with Credit History: Formalization -- REFERENCES 
546 |a English. 
650 0 |a Bank loans  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Banks and banking.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85011609 
650 6 |a Prêts bancaires  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Bank loans  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00826709 
650 7 |a Banks and banking.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00826867 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b Western Hemisphere Department,  |e issuing body.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n82237138 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Blavy, Rodolphe.  |t Monitoring and commitment in bank lending behavior.  |d [Washington, D.C] : International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Dept., 2005  |w (OCoLC)65175668 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/05/222.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 
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