Deposit insurance regulatory forbearance and economic growth : implications for the Japanese banking crisis /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Dekle, Robert, author.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, ©2005.
Description:1 online resource (33 pages).
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/05/169
IMF working paper ; WP/05/169.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498731
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Kletzer, Kenneth, author.
IMF Institute, issuing body.
International Monetary Fund, issuing body.
ISBN:1283513986
9781283513982
9781451861884
1451861885
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 31-33).
Print version record.
Summary:An endogenous growth model with financial intermediation demonstrates how deposit insurance and prudential regulatory forbearance lead to banking crises and growth declines. The model assumptions are based on features of the Japanese financial system and regulation. The model demonstrates how banking and growth crises can evolve under perfect foresight. The dynamics for economic aggregates and asset prices predicted by the model are shown to be generally consistent with the experience of the Japanese economy and financial system through the 1990s. We also test our maintained hypothesis of rational expectations using asset price data for Japan over the 1980s and 1990s.
Other form:Print version: Dekle, Robert. Deposit insurance regulatory forbearance and economic growth. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, ©2005