Democratic accountability, deficit bias, and independent fiscal agencies /
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| Author / Creator: | Debrun, Xavier, author. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2011. |
| Description: | 1 online resource (16 pages) |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | IMF working paper ; WP/11/173 IMF working paper ; WP/11/173. |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12499403 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Debrun, Xavier, |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Democratic accountability, deficit bias, and independent fiscal agencies / |c Xavier Debrun. |
| 260 | |a [Washington, D.C.] : |b International Monetary Fund, |c ©2011. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (16 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/11/173 | |
| 500 | |a At head of title: Fiscal Affairs Department. | ||
| 500 | |a Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed September 9, 2011). | ||
| 500 | |a "July 2011." | ||
| 520 | |a Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on "fiscal councils" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing "commitment technologies" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline. | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. An Illustrative Model of Fiscal Policy; A. Objectives and Constraints; B. Benchmark Equilibria; III. Institutional Solutions to the Deficit Bias: the Central Bank Analogy; A. From Central Bank Independence; B. ... to Independent Fiscal Institutions; C. Conclusion and Moving Forward; IV. Democratic Accountability and Independent Agencies; V. Concluding Remarks; References; Footnotes. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Fiscal policy |x Political aspects |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Banks and banking, Central |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Budget deficits |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Politique fiscale |x Aspect politique |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Banques centrales |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Déficit budgétaire |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks and banking, Central |x Econometric models. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00827041 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Budget deficits |x Econometric models. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00840406 | |
| 655 | 4 | |a Electronic books. | |
| 710 | 2 | |a International Monetary Fund. |b Fiscal Affairs Department, |e issuing body. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Debrun, Xavier. |t Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies. |d Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2011 |z 9781462313327 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/11/173. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2011/173/001.2011.issue-173-en.xml |y INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND |
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| 928 | |t Library of Congress classification |a HJ192.5.D437 2011eb |l Online |c UC-FullText |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2011/173/001.2011.issue-173-en.xml |z INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND |g ebooks |i 12143527 | ||