Capital regulation and tail risk /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Perotti, Enrico Camillo, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2011.
Description:1 online resource (39 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper, 1018-5941 ; WP/11/188
IMF working paper ; WP/11/188.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12499454
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Ratnovski, Lev, author.
Vlahu, Razvan E., 1977- author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
ISBN:1283567822
9781283567824
9781463900663
146390066X
1462308260
9781462308262
9781462308262
Notes:At head of title: Research Department.
Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed October 7, 2011).
"August 2011."
Includes bibliographical references.
Summary:The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk asserts. We show that this undermines the traditional result that high capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an unintended effect of enabling banks to take more tail risk without the fear of breaching the minimal capital ratio in non-tail risky project realizations. The results are consistent with stylized facts about pre-crisis bank behavior, and suggest implications for the optimal design of capital regulation.
Other form:Print version: Fund, International Monetary. Capital Regulation and Tail Risk. Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2011 9781462308262
Standard no.:10.5089/9781462308262.001

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