Innovation in banking and excessive loan growth /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Hardy, Daniel C. L., author.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Dept., 2008.
©2008
Description:1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/08/188
IMF working paper ; WP/08/188.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12499549
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Tieman, Alexander F., author.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
ISBN:1282841394
9781282841390
Notes:"July 2008."
Includes bibliographical references (pages 25-26).
Print version record.
Summary:The volume of credit extended by a bank can be an informative signal of its abilities in loan selection and management. It is shown that, under asymmetric information, banks may therefore rationally lend more than they would otherwise in order to demonstrate their quality, thus negatively affecting financial system soundness. Small shifts in technology and uncertainty associated with new technology may lead to large jumps in equilibrium outcomes. Prudential measures and supervision are therefore warranted.
Other form:Print version: Hardy, Daniel C.L. Innovation in banking and excessive loan growth. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Dept., 2008

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Innovation in banking and excessive loan growth /  |c prepared by Daniel C. Hardy and Alexander F. Tieman. 
260 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.,  |c 2008. 
264 4 |c ©2008 
300 |a 1 online resource (28 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/08/188 
500 |a "July 2008." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 25-26). 
520 3 |a The volume of credit extended by a bank can be an informative signal of its abilities in loan selection and management. It is shown that, under asymmetric information, banks may therefore rationally lend more than they would otherwise in order to demonstrate their quality, thus negatively affecting financial system soundness. Small shifts in technology and uncertainty associated with new technology may lead to large jumps in equilibrium outcomes. Prudential measures and supervision are therefore warranted. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
505 0 |a I. Introduction; Figures; 1. Change in the ratio of credit to GDP, 2003-2007; II. The Model; Tables; 1. Expected Payoffs in Different States; III. Model Analysis; A. Full Information; B. Equilibria with Partial Information and Two Bank Types; Pooling; Separating; A parameterized example; C. Separating Equilibrium with Partial Information and a Continuum of Bank Types; 2. The Value Function for Different Types: Separating Equilibrium; IV. Extensions; A. Investment in Loan Technology; 3. Credit Volumes and Bank Characteristics for a Continuum of Types 
505 8 |a 2. Investment Decision Starting From and Ending at Pooling EquilibriaB. Pervasive Moral Hazard and Low-Credit Outcomes; 3. Investment Decision Starting From and Ending at Separating Equilibria; 4. Separating Equilibrium with Low Credit Volume; V. Summary and Conclusions; 5. Pooling Equilibrium with Low Credit Volume; References; Appendix; I: Expected Loan Losses in a Pooling Equilibrium; II: Regularity Conditions on the Objective Function with a Continuum of Bank Types 
650 0 |a Bank loans  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Prêts bancaires  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Bank loans  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00826709 
650 7 |a Kreditgeschäft.  |2 stw 
650 7 |a Asymmetrische Information.  |2 stw 
650 7 |a Signalling.  |2 stw 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
700 1 |a Tieman, Alexander F.,  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2003124713 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b Monetary and Capital Markets Department.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2006113696 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Hardy, Daniel C.L.  |t Innovation in banking and excessive loan growth.  |d Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Dept., 2008  |w (OCoLC)255967187 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/08/188.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 
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