A model of sovereign debt in democracies /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Alichi, Ali, author.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, African Dept., 2008.
©2008
Description:1 online resource (34 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/08/152
IMF working paper ; WP/08/152.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12499604
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:International Monetary Fund. African Department.
ISBN:1451914636
9781451914634
9781451870107
1451870108
Notes:"June 2008."
Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-25).
Print version record.
Summary:This paper develops and empirically tests a political economy model of sovereign debt. The main incentive for repaying sovereign debt is to maintain access to international capital markets. However, in a democracy, one generation may choose default regardless of its consequences for future generations. An old generation with little concern for its country's access to capital markets can force a default on debt if it has the majority of voters. On the other hand, if the younger generation is more numerous, it can force repayment of previously defaulted debt. Other voter heterogeneities, such as in income, can generate similar results.
Other form:Print version: Alichi, Ali. Model of sovereign debt in democracies. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, African Dept., 2008
Standard no.:10.5089/9781451914634.001

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000 a 4500
001 12499604
006 m o d
007 cr un||||a|a||
008 111122s2008 dcua ob i000 0 eng d
005 20240822221619.1
019 |a 265807482  |a 875238875  |a 961693711  |a 962728337  |a 1055312786  |a 1058186938  |a 1066444230  |a 1081244560  |a 1107333619  |a 1148146628  |a 1202542989  |a 1228572843 
020 |a 1451914636 
020 |a 9781451914634 
020 |a 9781451870107 
020 |a 1451870108  |q (Trade Paper) 
024 8 |a 10.5089/9781451914634.001 
035 9 |a (OCLCCM-CC)762485783 
035 |a (OCoLC)762485783  |z (OCoLC)265807482  |z (OCoLC)875238875  |z (OCoLC)961693711  |z (OCoLC)962728337  |z (OCoLC)1055312786  |z (OCoLC)1058186938  |z (OCoLC)1066444230  |z (OCoLC)1081244560  |z (OCoLC)1107333619  |z (OCoLC)1148146628  |z (OCoLC)1202542989  |z (OCoLC)1228572843 
037 |b 00013468 
040 |a OCLCE  |b eng  |e pn  |c OCLCE  |d CUS  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCA  |d EBLCP  |d E7B  |d CCO  |d OCLCF  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d OTZ  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCA  |d YDXCP  |d VT2  |d CUS  |d OCLCQ  |d COCUF  |d MERUC  |d MOR  |d PIFPO  |d ZCU  |d OCLCQ  |d U3W  |d STF  |d CEF  |d NRAMU  |d CRU  |d ICG  |d VTS  |d OCLCQ  |d AU@  |d OCLCQ  |d WYU  |d TKN  |d DKC  |d OCLCQ  |d TUHNV  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ 
049 |a MAIN 
050 4 |a HG3881.5.I58  |b W67 no.08/152 
100 1 |a Alichi, Ali,  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2008094019 
245 1 2 |a A model of sovereign debt in democracies /  |c prepared by Ali Alichi. 
260 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund, African Dept.,  |c 2008. 
264 4 |c ©2008 
300 |a 1 online resource (34 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a IMF working paper,  |x 2227-8885 ;  |v WP/08/152 
500 |a "June 2008." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-25). 
520 3 |a This paper develops and empirically tests a political economy model of sovereign debt. The main incentive for repaying sovereign debt is to maintain access to international capital markets. However, in a democracy, one generation may choose default regardless of its consequences for future generations. An old generation with little concern for its country's access to capital markets can force a default on debt if it has the majority of voters. On the other hand, if the younger generation is more numerous, it can force repayment of previously defaulted debt. Other voter heterogeneities, such as in income, can generate similar results. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
650 0 |a Debts, Public  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Capital market  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Dettes publiques  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Marché financier  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Capital market  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00846359 
650 7 |a Debts, Public  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00888859 
650 7 |a Auslandsverschuldung.  |2 stw 
650 7 |a Auslandsschuldendienst.  |2 stw 
650 7 |a Demokratie.  |2 stw 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b African Department. 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Alichi, Ali.  |t Model of sovereign debt in democracies.  |d Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, African Dept., 2008  |w (OCoLC)248692213 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/08/152.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 
856 4 0 |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2008/152/001.2008.issue-152-en.xml  |y INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
929 |a oclccm 
999 f f |i e070afa2-2b62-5060-9b24-e59dd6fd6a48  |s 8b0092f9-2a54-54dd-bb5d-3fa06d9dedbd 
928 |t Library of Congress classification  |a HG3881.5.I58W67 no.08/152  |l Online  |c UC-FullText  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2008/152/001.2008.issue-152-en.xml  |z INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND  |g ebooks  |i 12143730