Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | Moita, Rodrigo, author.
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| ISBN: | 1282448315
9781282448315
9781451909739
145190973X
1462301363
9781462301362
1452758204
9781452758206
9786613821508
6613821500
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| Digital file characteristics: | text file
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references.
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2011.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2011 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry may fall in periods immediately preceding an election. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical model. Using quarterly data from 32 industrial and developing countries over 1978-2004, we find strong statistical and econometric evidence pointing toward the existence of electoral price cycles in gasoline markets.
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| Other form: | Print version: Paiva, Claudio. Political price cycles in regulated industries. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451909739.001
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