Monetary policy committees, learning and communication /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Weber, Anke, 1981- author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2010.
Description:1 online resource (41 pages) : color illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/10/85
IMF working paper ; WP/10/85.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12499735
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department, issuing body.
ISBN:128355240X
9781283552400
9781452751054
1452751056
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Print version record.
Summary:This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee's decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing.
Other form:Print version: Weber, Anke. Monetary Policy Committees, Learning, and Communication. Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2010 9781451982633

MARC

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100 1 |a Weber, Anke,  |d 1981-  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/nr2006000888 
245 1 0 |a Monetary policy committees, learning and communication /  |c prepared by Anke Weber. 
260 |a [Washington, D.C.] :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c ©2010. 
300 |a 1 online resource (41 pages) :  |b color illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/10/85 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
520 |a This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee's decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing. 
505 0 |a Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. General Setup; B. Uncertainty About The Central Bank's Preferences; III. Monetary Policy Committee Decision-Making; A. The Preferences of Committee Members; B. Timing; C. The Policy Decision; C.1. Decision-making by consensus; C.2. Individualistic decision-making; IV. The Private Sector; A. Complete Opacity by Committee Members; B. Voting records and policy minutes published; C. Imperfect Communication of Preferences; C.1. No uncertainty about the precision of public information. 
505 8 |a C.2. Imperfect knowledge of the precision of public informationV. Results; A. Perfect Knowledge Benchmark; B. Private Sector Imperfect Knowledge; B.1. Voting records and policy minutes are published; B.2. A chairman with added influence; B.3. Voting records and speeches are published; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; 1. RMSE of the public under averaging and voting: homogeneous policymakers; 2. RMSE of the public under averaging and voting: heterogeneous policymakers; 3. RMSE of the public with heterogeneous policymakers for different constant gains. 
505 8 |a 4. RMSE of the public with homogeneous policymakers for different constant gains5. RMSE of the public under consensus with special influence of the chairman; 6. RMSE of the public under majority voting with special influence of the chairman; 7. RMSE of the public under majority voting with imperfect knowledge of precision of public information; Sensitivity Analysis; 1. Private sector RMSEs, preferences less persistent than in benchmark case; 2. Private sector RMSEs, preferences more persistent than in benchmark case. 
505 8 |a 3. Private sector RMSEs, complete opacity, different persistence of members' preferences4. Effects of changing the variance of the noise in the preference aggregation equation; 5. Effects of varying N, heterogeneous members; 6. Effects of varying N, homogeneous members; 7. Private sector RMSEs, different variances of committee members' preferences; 8. Complete opacity, different variances of committee members' preferences; References; Footnotes. 
650 0 |a Banks and banking  |z Central America  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Monetary policy  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Politique monétaire  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Banks and banking  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00826918 
650 7 |a Monetary policy  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01025234 
651 7 |a Central America.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01244535 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b Middle East and Central Asia Department,  |e issuing body.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2004029012 
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830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/10/85.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 
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