Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department, issuing body.
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| ISBN: | 128355240X
9781283552400
9781452751054
1452751056
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references.
Print version record.
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| Summary: | This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee's decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing.
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| Other form: | Print version: Weber, Anke. Monetary Policy Committees, Learning, and Communication. Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2010 9781451982633
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