Fiscal rules and the sovereign default premium /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2012.
Description:1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/12/30
IMF working paper ; WP/12/30.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12499985
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Martinez, Leonardo (Economist), author.
Roch, Francisco, author.
IMF Institute, issuing body.
ISBN:9781463933159
1463933150
Notes:At head of title: IMF Institute.
Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed January 25, 2012).
"January 2012."
Includes bibliographical references.
Summary:This paper finds optimal fiscal rule parameter values and measures the effects of imposing fiscal rules using a default model calibrated to an economy that in the absence of a fiscal rule pays a significant sovereign default premium. The paper also studies the case in which the government conducts a voluntary debt restructuring to capture the capital gains from the increase in its debt market value implied by a rule announcement. In addition, the paper shows how debt ceilings may reduce the procyclicality of fiscal policy and thus consumption volatility.

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