"Puts" in the shadow /

"Puts" in the shadow /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Singh, Manmohan, 1964-
Imprint:	Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2012.
Description:	1 online resource (21 pages) : charts
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 1018-5941 ; WP/12/229 IMF working paper ; WP/12/229.
Subject:	Derivative securities -- Econometric models. Asset-backed financing -- Econometric models. Deposit insurance -- Econometric models. Moral hazard -- Econometric models. Deposit insurance -- Econometric models. Derivative securities -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12500801

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund.
ISBN:	1475555709 9781475555707 147551056X 9781475510560 9781475510560
Notes:	"September 2012." Includes bibliographical references (page 21).
Summary:	In the aftermath of the Lehman crisis, payouts (i.e., taxpayer bailouts) in various forms were provided by governments to a variety of financial institutions and markets that were outside the regulatory perimeter - the - "shadow" banking system. Although recent regulatory proposals attempt to reduce these - "puts", we provide examples from non-banking activities within a bank, money market funds, Triparty repo, OTC derivatives market, collateral with central banks, and issuance of floating rate notes etc., that these risks remain. We suggest that a regulatory environment where puts are not ambiguous will likely lower the cost of bail-outs after a crisis.
Other form:	Print Version: Singh, Manmohan. Puts in the Shadow. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2012 9781475510560
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781475510560.001

Description
Summary:	In the aftermath of the Lehman crisis, payouts (i.e., taxpayer bailouts) in various forms were provided by governments to a variety of financial institutions and markets that were outside the regulatory perimeter - the "shadow" banking system. Although recent regulatory proposals attempt to reduce these "puts", we provide examples from non-banking activities within a bank, money market funds, Triparty repo, OTC derivatives market, collateral with central banks, and issuance of floating rate notes etc., that these risks remain. We suggest that a regulatory environment where puts are not ambiguous will likely lower the cost of bail-outs after a crisis.
Item Description:	"September 2012."
Physical Description:	1 online resource (21 pages) : charts
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (page 21).
ISBN:	1475555709 9781475555707 147551056X 9781475510560
ISSN:	1018-5941 ;