Reserve requirements, the maturity structure of debt, and bank runs /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Al-Zein, Eza Ghassan, 1978- author.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
©2008
Description:1 online resource (26 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/08/108
IMF working paper ; WP/08/108.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12501072
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other uniform titles:IMF eLibrary.
Other authors / contributors:International Monetary Fund.
ISBN:1451914229
9781451914221
1282840622
9781282840621
9781451914221
Notes:Available in PDF, ePUB, and Mobi formats on the Internet.
Includes bibliographical references.
Summary:The paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run.

MARC

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100 1 |a Al-Zein, Eza Ghassan,  |d 1978-  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2008115909 
245 1 0 |a Reserve requirements, the maturity structure of debt, and bank runs /  |c prepared by Eza Al-Zein. 
260 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2008. 
264 4 |c ©2008 
300 |a 1 online resource (26 pages) 
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490 1 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/08/108 
500 |a Available in PDF, ePUB, and Mobi formats on the Internet. 
520 |a The paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
505 0 |a I. Introduction; II. Motivation and Literature; III. The Model; A. The Domestic Economy; B. Date-Specific and Maturity-Specific Reserve Requirements; C. The Lenders' Problem; D. Defining the Equilibrium; Figures; 1. Structure of the Model; IV. The Emergence of Bank Runs; A. The Emergence of Bank Runs in the Setup Without Reserve Requirements; Defining the Illiquidity Condition; 2. Decision Tree at t=1 Summarizes How a Bank Run Would Occur.; B. Can Reserve Requirements Prevent the Occurrence of a Bank Run?; Illiquidity Conditions with Reserve Requirements 
505 8 |a Reserve Requirements and Market FailureC. International Lending After the Bank Runs: Are International Lenders "Throwing Good Money After Bad Money"?; International Re-Optimization Problem; V. Discussion; Sunspot and Bank Run Probability; Incentive to Form a Bank; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References 
650 0 |a Bank reserves  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Banks and banking, Central  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Bank failures  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Debts, Public  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Banques  |x Réserves  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Banques centrales  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Banques  |x Faillites  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Dettes publiques  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Bank failures  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00826659 
650 7 |a Bank reserves  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00826778 
650 7 |a Banks and banking, Central  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00827041 
650 7 |a Debts, Public  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00888859 
655 0 |a Electronic books. 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
730 0 |a IMF eLibrary. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n81052755 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/08/108.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 
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