Liquidity and transparency in bank risk management /
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| Author / Creator: | Ratnovski, Lev. |
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| Imprint: | [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2013. |
| Description: | 1 online resource (41 pages) |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | IMF working paper ; WP/13/16 IMF working paper ; WP/13/16. |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12501494 |
| Summary: | Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks' transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency. |
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| Item Description: | Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Jan. 30, 2013). "Research Department. "January 2013." |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (41 pages) |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 9781475545883 1475545886 9781475536157 1475536151 9781616356774 1616356774 |