Non-defaultable debt and sovereign risk /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, author.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute for Capacity Development, 2014.
Description:1 online resource (25 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP14/198
IMF working paper ; WP14/198.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12504138
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Martínez, Leonardo, author.
Onder, Yasin Kursat, author.
International Monetary Fund.
International Monetary Fund. Institute for Capacity Development, issuing body.
ISBN:9781484340660
1484340663
Notes:"October 2014."
Summary:"The authors quantify gains from introducing non-defaultable debt as a limited additional financing option into a model of equilibrium sovereign risk. They find that, for an initial (defaultable) sovereign debt level equal to 66 percent of trend aggregate income and a sovereign spread of 2.9 percent, introducing the possibility of issuing non-defaultable debt for up to 10 percent of aggregate income reduces immediately the spread to 1.4 percent, and implies a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of 0.9 percent. The spread reduction would be only 0.1 (0.2) percentage points higher if the government uses nondefaultable debt to buy back (finance a 'voluntary' debt exchange for) previously issued defaultable debt. Without restrictions to defaultable debt issuances in the future, the spread reduction achieved by the introduction of non-defaultable debt is short lived. They also show that allowing governments in default to increase non-defaultable debt is damaging at the time non-defaultable debt is introduced and inconsequential in the medium term. These findings shed light on different aspects of proposals to introduce common euro-area sovereign bonds that could be virtually non-defaultable."--Abstract.

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Non-defaultable debt and sovereign risk /  |c prepared by Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, Yasin Kursat Onder. 
260 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute for Capacity Development,  |c 2014. 
300 |a 1 online resource (25 pages) 
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520 |a "The authors quantify gains from introducing non-defaultable debt as a limited additional financing option into a model of equilibrium sovereign risk. They find that, for an initial (defaultable) sovereign debt level equal to 66 percent of trend aggregate income and a sovereign spread of 2.9 percent, introducing the possibility of issuing non-defaultable debt for up to 10 percent of aggregate income reduces immediately the spread to 1.4 percent, and implies a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of 0.9 percent. The spread reduction would be only 0.1 (0.2) percentage points higher if the government uses nondefaultable debt to buy back (finance a 'voluntary' debt exchange for) previously issued defaultable debt. Without restrictions to defaultable debt issuances in the future, the spread reduction achieved by the introduction of non-defaultable debt is short lived. They also show that allowing governments in default to increase non-defaultable debt is damaging at the time non-defaultable debt is introduced and inconsequential in the medium term. These findings shed light on different aspects of proposals to introduce common euro-area sovereign bonds that could be virtually non-defaultable."--Abstract. 
505 0 |a Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Model; A. Recursive formulation; B. Recursive equilibrium; III. Calibration; IV. Results; Tables; 1. Parameter values; A. Effects of introducing non-defaultable bonds; 2. Effects of introducing non-defaultable bonds; Figures; 1. Debt after the introduction of non-defaultable bonds; 2. Default decision with and without non-defaultable bonds; B. Debt buybacks; 3. Effects of introducing non-defaultable bonds with a defaultable-debt buyback; C. "Voluntary" debt exchanges; 3. Debt after the introduction of non-defaultable bonds through a buyback. 
505 8 |a D. Long-run effect of non-defaultable on default risk4. Effects of introducing non-defaultable bonds with a "voluntary" debt exchange; 4. Sovereign spread after the introduction of non-defaultable bonds; E. Voluntary debt exchanges with a limit for defaultable debt; F. Issuances of non-defaultable bonds during defaults; 5. Effects of introducing non-defaultable bonds with a limit for defaultable debt; V. Conclusions; References. 
650 0 |a Debts, Public  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Default (Finance)  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Dettes publiques  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Défaillance (Finances)  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Debts, Public  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00888859 
650 7 |a Default (Finance)  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00889574 
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700 1 |a Onder, Yasin Kursat,  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2013143074 
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