Energy subsidies and public social spending : theory and evidence /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Ebeke, Christian, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2015.
Description:1 online resource (30 pages) : color illustrations, color maps.
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/15/101
IMF working paper ; WP/15/101.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12504452
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Lonkeng Ngouana, Constant.
International Monetary Fund. European Department.
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department.
ISBN:1475580746
9781475580747
9781475580747
ISSN:1018-5941
Notes:"May 2015."
"European Department and Fiscal Affairs Department."
Includes bibliographical references (pages 25-26).
Online resource; title from pdf title page (IMF.org Web site, viewed May 11, 2015).
Summary:This paper shows that high energy subsidies and low public social spending can emerge as an equilibrium outcome of a political game between the elite and the middle-class when the provision of public goods is subject to bottlenecks, reflecting weak domestic institutions. We test this and other predictions of our model using a large cross-section of emerging markets and low-income countries. The main empirical challenge is that subsidies and social spending could be jointly determined (e.g., at the time of the budget), leading to a simultaneity bias in OLS estimates. To address this concern, we adopt an identification strategy whereby subsidies in a given country are instrumented by the level of subsidies in neighboring countries. Our Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations suggest that public expenditures in education and health were on average lower by 0.6 percentage point of GDP in countries where energy subsidies were 1 percentage point of GDP higher. Moreover, we find that the crowding-out was stronger in the presence of weak domestic institutions, narrow fiscal space, and among the net oil importers. --Abstract.
Other form:Print Version: 9781475580747
Standard no.:10.5089/9781475580747.001

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Energy subsidies and public social spending :  |b theory and evidence /  |c prepared by Christian Ebeke and Constant Lonkeng Ngouana. 
260 |a [Washington, D.C.] :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c ©2015. 
300 |a 1 online resource (30 pages) :  |b color illustrations, color maps. 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/15/101 
500 |a "May 2015." 
500 |a "European Department and Fiscal Affairs Department." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 25-26). 
520 |a This paper shows that high energy subsidies and low public social spending can emerge as an equilibrium outcome of a political game between the elite and the middle-class when the provision of public goods is subject to bottlenecks, reflecting weak domestic institutions. We test this and other predictions of our model using a large cross-section of emerging markets and low-income countries. The main empirical challenge is that subsidies and social spending could be jointly determined (e.g., at the time of the budget), leading to a simultaneity bias in OLS estimates. To address this concern, we adopt an identification strategy whereby subsidies in a given country are instrumented by the level of subsidies in neighboring countries. Our Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations suggest that public expenditures in education and health were on average lower by 0.6 percentage point of GDP in countries where energy subsidies were 1 percentage point of GDP higher. Moreover, we find that the crowding-out was stronger in the presence of weak domestic institutions, narrow fiscal space, and among the net oil importers. --Abstract. 
588 0 |a Online resource; title from pdf title page (IMF.org Web site, viewed May 11, 2015). 
650 0 |a Power resources  |x Subsidies  |z Developing countries  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Energy policy  |z Developing countries  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Expenditures, Public  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Social policy  |x Economic aspects  |z Developing countries  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Education  |z Developing countries  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Public health  |z Developing countries  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Public goods  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Crowding out (Economics)  |z Developing countries  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Dépenses publiques  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Biens collectifs  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Crowding out (Economics)  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00884272 
650 7 |a Education  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00902609 
650 7 |a Energy policy  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00910209 
650 7 |a Expenditures, Public  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00918354 
650 7 |a Public goods  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01082232 
650 7 |a Public health  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01082257 
651 7 |a Developing countries.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01242969 
655 0 |a Electronic books. 
700 1 |a Lonkeng Ngouana, Constant.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2012037787 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b European Department.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n86100166 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b Fiscal Affairs Department.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n81027435 
776 0 8 |a Print Version:  |z 9781475580747 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/15/101.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 
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