Delegated portfolio management, benchmarking, and the effects on financial markets /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Igan, Deniz, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2015.
Description:1 online resource (39 pages) : color illustrations.
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/15/198
IMF working paper ; WP/15/198.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12504697
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Other authors / contributors:Pinheiro, Marcelo de Albuquerque, 1974- author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN:1513586874
9781513586878
ISSN:1018-5941
Notes:"September 2015."
"Research Department."
Includes bibliographical references (pages 25-27).
Online resource; title from pdf title page (IMF.org Web site, viewed September 15, 2015).
Summary:We analyze the implications of linking the compensation of fund managers to the return of their portfolio relative to that of a benchmark---a common solution to the agency problem in delegated portfolio management. In the presence of such relative performance- based objectives, investors have reduced expected utility but markets are typically more informative and deeper. Furthermore, in a multiple asset/market framework we show that (i) relative performance concerns lead to an increase in the correlation between markets (financial contagion); (ii) benchmark inclusion increases price volatility; (iii) home bias emerges as a rational outcome. When information is costly, information acquisition is hindered and this attenuates the effects on informativeness and depth of the market.--Abstract.
Standard no.:10.5089/9781513586878.001