Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | Debrun, Xavier. (IMFstaff), author.
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department, issuing body.
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| ISBN: | 1484322908
9781484322901
1484330145
9781484330142
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| ISSN: | 1018-5941
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| Notes: | "April 2016."
At head of title: "Fiscal Affairs Department."
Includes bibliographical references (pages 24-25).
Description based on online resource; title from pdf title page (IMF.org Web site, viewed April 11, 2016).
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| Summary: | The paper discusses the effectiveness of independent fiscal institutions -- or fiscal councils -- in taming the deficit bias that emerged in the 1970s. After a review of the main theoretical arguments and recent trends about fiscal councils, we develop a stylized model showing how a fiscal council can effectively mitigate the deficit bias even though it has no direct lever on the conduct of fiscal policy. We show that the capacity of the fiscal council to improve the public's understanding of the quality of fiscal policy contributes to better align voters and policymakers' incentives and to tame the deficit bias affecting well-intended governments. After mapping the model's key features into a broad set of criteria likely to contribute to the effectiveness of a fiscal council, we use the 2014 vintage of the IMF dataset on independent fiscal institutions to assess whether existing institutions have been built to work.
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| Other form: | 1-4843-2290-8
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781484322901.001
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