How corruption and anti-corruption policies sustain hybrid regimes strategies of political domination under Ukraine's presidents in 1994-2014

How corruption and anti-corruption policies sustain hybrid regimes strategies of political domination under Ukraine's presidents in 1994-2014

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Huss, Oksana, author
Imprint:Stuttgart ibidem-Verlag 2020
Description:xxiv, 371 pages 21 cm
Language:English
Series:Soviet and post-Soviet politics and society (SPPS) 1614-3515 vol. 218
Subject:
Political corruption -- Ukraine.
Ukraine -- Politics and government -- 1991-
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12523356
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:3838214307
9783838214306
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 325-356)
Table of Contents:
  • Abstract
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • List of Abbreviations
  • Acknowledgments
  • Foreword
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. The research puzzle
  • 1.2. The research question
  • 1.3. The central argument
  • 1.4. Methods of data collection and analysis
  • 1.5. The structure of this study
  • 2. Conceptualizing corruption: Definitions, typologies and explanatory approaches
  • 2.1. From worldview to the concept
  • 2.2. Core characteristics of corruption
  • 2.3. Varieties of corruption
  • 2.3.1. Distinguishing context: Corruption as an exception vs. corruption as the norm
  • 2.3.2. Distinguishing relevant forms of corruption
  • 2.4. Corruption as an umbrella concept
  • 2.4.1. Particularism and conflict of interest
  • 2.4.2. Clientelism
  • 2.4.3. Patronage
  • 2.4.4. Control in clientelistic and patronage networks
  • 2.4.5. Patrimonialism
  • 2.4.6. State capture
  • 2.5. System as an analytical concept for corruption clusters in hybrid regimes
  • 2.5.1. Defining the system of corruption
  • 2.5.2. Typology of the system of corruption
  • 3. Combining constructivist and empirical-analytical perspectives on corruption
  • 3.1. Constructivist perspective
  • 3.1.1. Corruption as an empty signifier
  • 3.1.2. From articulation to construction of social identities and institutions
  • 3.1.3. Framing corruption as a tool in political tactics
  • 3.1.4. The role of corruption and anti-corruption in hegemonic struggle
  • 3.2. Theoretical explanatory approaches to corruption: Agency vs. institutions
  • 3.2.1. Agency-centered micro-perspective
  • 3.2.2. Institution-centered macro-perspective
  • 3.3. Synthesis: Variety of corruption meanings as framing options
  • 4. Conceptualizing hybrid regimes and the role of corruption in them
  • 4.1. Hybrid regime concepts at a glance
  • 4.2. Characteristics of hybrid regimes
  • 4.2.1. Distinguishing hybrid regimes from democracy and authoritarianism
  • 4.2.2. Uneven playing field
  • 4.2.3. Power asymmetries in semi-presidentialism
  • 4.2.4. The interplay of formal and informal institutions in hybrid regimes
  • 4.3. Dynamic of hybrid regimes and the role of corruption
  • 4.3.1. Scenarios of elite interaction and corresponding type of corruption systems
  • 4.3.2. Operationalizing regime dynamics
  • 4.4. Operationalizing actors' action: political strategy and tactics in hybrid regimes
  • 4.4.1. The interplay of structural context and individual actors' action
  • 4.4.2. Defining strategy and tactics
  • 4.4.3. Actors' strategic calculations in hybrid regimes: Goals, resources, environment
  • 5. The system of corruption in Ukraine and its role in sustaining regime hybridity
  • 5.1. The role of the oligarchs
  • 5.2. A system of corruption model
  • 5.2.1. Political parties
  • 5.2.2. Elections
  • 5.2.3. Political influence
  • 5.2.4. Political outcome side
  • 5.3. Synthesis: An uneven playing field as a result of corruption practices
  • 6. Case study of the political domination of Leonid Kuchma: Functions and implications of the centralized system of corruption
  • 6.1. Outset: Regime trajectory, power resources and constellation of actors
  • 6.1.1. Fragmentation of power: Institutional and political competition
  • 6.1.2. Points of reference for strategic interaction
  • 6.1.3. Synthesis
  • 6.2. Corrupt practices as tactics for political domination
  • 6.2.1. Neo-patrimonial decision-making between 1994 and 1998
  • 6.2.2. Change of the political domination strategy: From exclusion to co-optation
  • 6.2.3. Patronage
  • 6.2.4. Clientelism
  • 6.2.5. Non-coercive control: Corruption-based kompromat and blackmail
  • 6.2.6. Synthesis
  • 6.3. Corruption framing as a tactic for political domination
  • 6.3.1. Antagonism of strong principal and "invisible enemy"
  • 6.3.2. Framing of corruption as a principal-agent problem
  • 6.3.3. Suggested remedies
  • 6.3.4. Crisis and change: Framing shift toward perpetual corruption in society
  • 6.3.5. Popular attitudes
  • 6.3.6. Synthesis
  • 6.4. Assessment of the anti-corruption policies
  • 6.4.1. Constellation of actors and control of corruption in early 1990s
  • 6.4.2. Political domination by means of anti-corruption institutions
  • 6.4.3. Conceptualization of corruption in legislation
  • 6.4.4. Synthesis
  • 6.5. Conclusion
  • 7. Case study of the political domination of Viktor Yushchenko: Functions and implications of the decentralized system of corruption
  • 7.1. Outset: Regime trajectory, power resources and constellation of actors
  • 7.1.1. Renewal of the elite
  • 7.1.2. Fragmentation of power: Institutional and political competition
  • 7.1.3. Synthesis
  • 7.2. Corrupt practices as tactics for political domination
  • 7.2.1. Shifting towards a gray zone of governance
  • 7.2.2. Favoritism under Yushchenko: Bargaining in patron-client networks
  • 7.2.3. Synthesis
  • 7.3. Corruption framing as a tactic for political domination
  • 7.3.1. Antagonism of democracy and authoritarianism
  • 7.3.2. Framing of corruption as a system
  • 7.3.3. Crisis and change: Framing shift toward the concept of "political corruption"
  • 7.3.4. Suggested remedies
  • 7.3.5. Popular attitudes
  • 7.3.6. Synthesis
  • 7.4. Assessment of the anti-corruption policies
  • 7.4.1. Constellation of actors and control of corruption
  • 7.4.2. Conceptualization of corruption in legislation
  • 7.4.3. Synthesis
  • 7.5. Conclusion
  • 8. Case study of the political domination of Viktor Yanukovych: Functions and implications of the monopolized system of corruption
  • 8.1. Outset: Regime trajectory, power resources and constellation of actors
  • 8.1.1. Subordination of state institutions
  • 8.1.2. Synthesis
  • 8.2. Corrupt practices as tactics for political domination
  • 8.2.1. Particularism under Yanukovych
  • 8.2.2. Monetary corruption: An instrument of exclusion and monopolization of power
  • 8.2.3. Raising the "Family"
  • 8.2.4. Synthesis
  • 8.3. Corruption framing as a tactic for political domination
  • 8.3.1. Antagonism of chaos and order
  • 8.3.2. Functions of the empty meaning of "corruption".
  • 8.3.3. Framing corruption as a principal-agent problem
  • 8.3.4. Suggested remedies
  • 8.3.5. Popular attitudes
  • 8.3.6. Synthesis
  • 8.4. Assessment of the anti-corruption policies
  • 8.4.1. Constellation of actors and control of corruption
  • 8.4.2. Conceptualization of corruption in the legislation
  • 8.4.3. Synthesis
  • 8.5. Conclusion
  • 9. Conclusion
  • 9.1. Synopsis
  • 9.2. Comparative analysis
  • 9.2.1. Assessment of the strategies
  • 9.2.2. Comparison of political tactics
  • 9.3. Key findings and implications for counteracting corruption
  • 9.3. Prospects for further research
  • References
  • Secondary sources
  • Primary sources for the framing analysis
  • International Organizations: Documents, reports, assessments
  • Annex 1. Overview of the expert interview partners
  • Annex 2. List of online media for the search inquiry
  • Annex 3. MaxQDA code book
  • Annex 4. Anti-corruption legislation
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