The doctrine of conventionality control : between uniformity and legal pluralism in the inter-American human rights system /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:González-Domínguez, Pablo, author.
Imprint:Cambridge, United Kingdom ; Antwerp ; Portland : Intersentia, [2018]
Description:1 online resource (xxviii, 271 pages)
Language:English
Series:Law and cosmopolitan values ; 11
Law and cosmopolitan values ; 11.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12576456
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9781780686271
1780686277
9781780686660
1780686668
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 257-267) and index.
Print version record.
Summary:"The creation of the doctrine of conventionality control is one of the most recent and ambitious efforts undertaken by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to increase the effectiveness of and compliance with the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) at the State level. It is an international obligation of all State parties to interpret domestic law in accordance with the ACHR and with the Inter-American Corpus Juris more generally, and to avoid the enforcement of that law in the case that no consistent interpretation is legally possible. This book is the first that approaches conventionality control from an analytical, critical and normative perspective. The author applies the principle of subsidiarity as a theoretical framework to argue the legality of and clarify the content of conventionality control as an international legal obligation. This innovative approach explains the normative foundations and effects of the doctrine in a manner that increases the effectiveness of the ACHR and the decisions of the Inter-American Court, whilst also respecting the legitimate freedom of States in the way they implement international human rights law at a domestic level"--Back cover
Other form:Print version: González-Domínguez, Pablo. The doctrine of conventionality control. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; Antwerp ; Portland : Intersentia, [2018] 1780686277 9781780686271
Table of Contents:
  • Foreword
  • Acknowledgments
  • List of Cases and Opinions
  • List of Treaties, Instruments and Documents
  • General Introduction
  • 1. Overview
  • 2. Structure
  • 3. Methodology
  • Chapter 1. Jurisprudential Development of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Precedents of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 2.1. The Original Meaning of Articles 1.1 and 2
  • 2.1.1. Article 1.1: Obligation to Respect Rights
  • 2.1.2. Article 2: Domestic Legal Effects
  • 2.2. The Strengthening of the Normative Force of Article 2
  • 2.2.1. The Power of the Inter-American Court to Review Domestic Laws
  • 2.2.2. The Nullity Ab Initio of Domestic Laws
  • 3. Creation of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 3.1. Analytical Evaluation of Almonacid
  • 3.1.1. The Facts of the Case and the Reasoning of the Inter-American Court
  • 3.1.2. The Creation of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 3.1.3. The Theory Behind Conventionality Control
  • 3.2. The Strengthening of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 3.2.1. Aguado-Alfaro: Conventionality Control and the Duty of Domestic Judges to Ensure the Effectiveness of the American Convention
  • 3.2.2. Heliodoro: Complete Explanation of the Foundational Elements of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 3.3. The Hidden Pillar of Conventionality Control: The Direct Effect of the American Convention
  • 3.3.1. The State as a Unity: The Theoretical Proposition of García Ramírez in Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala (2003)
  • 3.3.2. The Moral Imperative to Fight Against Impunity: The Theoretical Construction of the Right to Access to Justice in the View of Cançado Trindade
  • 4. Further Development of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 4.1. Conventionality Control Must be Exercised on All Norms of a Domestic Legal System
  • 4.2. Conventionality Control as a Duty to Interpret Domestic Norms in a Manner Consistent with the Inter-American Corpus Juris
  • 4.3. All State Authorities Must Exercise Conventionality Control
  • 4.4. Conventionality Control and the Principle of Subsidiarity or Complementarity
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Chapter 2. Legal Analysis of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Elements of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 2.1. Definition and Legal Foundations
  • 2.1.1. Definition
  • 2.1.2. Legal Foundations
  • 2.2. Subjects of the Obligation
  • 2.2.1. The Judiciary, on All Its Levels
  • 2.2.2. All State Authorities
  • 2.3. Object of the Obligation
  • 2.3.1. Distinguishing the "Core" and the "Periphery" of Conventionality Control
  • 2.3.2. The "Core" of Conventionality Control
  • 2.3.2.1. Obligation to Exercise a Consistent Interpretation of Domestic Law
  • 2.3.2.2. Obligation to Avoid the Enforcement of Anti-Conventional Laws
  • 2.3.3. The "Periphery" of Conventionality Control
  • 2.3.3.1. Obligation to Fill Legal Lacunae
  • 2.3.3.2. Obligation to Control the Democratic Process
  • 2.3.3.3. Obligation to Guarantee the Effectiveness of the Inter-American Court's Judgments
  • 2.4. Special Features of the Obligation to Exercise Conventionality Control: The "Aguado-Alfaro Clause"
  • 2.4.1. Conventionality Control Shall Be Exercised Ex Officio
  • 2.4.2. The "Aguado-Alfaro Clause"
  • 2.5. Parameters of Conventionality Control
  • 2.5.1. Domestic Laws Subject to Conventionality Control
  • 2.5.2. Sources of Law that Serve as a Basis for Conventionality Control
  • 2.5.2.1. Treaty Law
  • 2.5.2.2. The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court
  • 2.5.2.3. The Existence of an Inter-American Corpus Juris
  • 3. The Relationship Between the Doctrine of Conventionality Control and Domestic Legal Systems
  • 3.1. The "Latin American Voyage"
  • 3.2. Normative Aspects that Shape the Operation of Conventionality Control in Domestic Legal Systems: A First Approach
  • 3.3. The Case of Mexico
  • 4. Conclusion
  • Chapter 3. Questioning the Legal Validity of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Objections to the Doctrine of Conventionality Control Based on Positive International Law
  • 2.1. First Objection: The "Anti-Conventionality" of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 2.1.1. The Protection to the Sovereignty of States as an Essential Component of Article 2
  • 2.1.2. The Distinction Between "Obligations of Specific Conduct" and "Obligations of Results" as Tools to Understand the Meaning of Article 2
  • 2.1.3. Subsidiary Sources of Criticism
  • 2.1.3.1. Preparatory Works of the American Convention
  • 2.1.3.2. The Understanding of the Programmatic Nature of Article 2 in the First Decisions of the Inter-American Court
  • 2.2. Second Objection: Problematic Interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
  • 2.2.1. Nature and Scope of Articles 26 and 27 of the VCLT
  • 2.2.2. The (In)compatibility Between the Doctrine of Conventionality Control and the VCLT
  • 2.3. Third Objection: The Problem of the Jurisprudential Origins of the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 2.3.1. No "Conventional" Obligation to Follow the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court Beyond a Case Where a State is a Party to the Controversy
  • 2.3.2. Logical Problems: Circularity in the Argument of the Inter-American Court
  • 2.3.3. Problems of Legitimacy in the Position of the Inter-American Court
  • 3. Structural Assumptions that Support the Objections Against the Doctrine of Conventionality Control
  • 3.1. Theories that Explain the Relationship Between International Law and Domestic Legal Systems
  • 3.1.1. Monism
  • 3.1.2. Dualism
  • 3.1.2.1. First Aspect: The Subjects of Law
  • 3.1.2.2. Second Aspect: The Sources of Law
  • 3.1.2.3. Third Aspect: The Interpretation of International Law at the Domestic Level
  • 3.2. An "Insuperable Paradox": The Logical Consequence of the Theory of Dualism
  • 3.3. Reflection on the Shortcomings of Dualism
  • 3.3.1. Jus Cogens Norms
  • 3.3.2. International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law
  • 3.3.3. International Human Rights Law
  • 4. Conclusion
  • Chapter 4. Reconstructing the Doctrine of Conventionality Control in Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Article 2 as a Basis for Conventionality Control
  • 2.1. The Existence of a High but not Absolute Freedom for States to Decide the Means to Comply with International Obligations
  • 2.2. The Principle of Subsidiarity
  • 2.3. Articles 2 and 63.1 in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity
  • 3. The Substance Behind Conventionality Control
  • 3.1. The Duty to Respect and Ensure the Core of Human Rights
  • 3.2. The Duty to Fight Against Impunity
  • 3.3. The Duty to Ensure the Right of Access to Justice
  • 4. Conventionality Control in Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity
  • 4.1. The Core of Conventionality Control
  • 4.2. Conventionality Control as a Principle
  • 4.2.1. Principles as Sources of Legal Obligations
  • 4.2.2. Conventionality Control as a Principle
  • 4.3. Normative Factors that "Regulate" the "Intensity" of Conventionality Control
  • 4.3.1. The Competences of Domestic Authorities and the Procedural Regulations that Shape the Judicial Process
  • 4.3.2. The Constitutional Hierarchy of the Inter-American Corpus Juris
  • 4.3.3. The "Openness" of International Human Rights Law
  • 5. Conclusion
  • General Conclusions
  • 1. The Court and its Circumstances
  • 2. The Essence of Conventionality Control
  • 3. A Controversial Doctrine of International Law
  • 4. A New Approach Based on the Principle of Subsidiarity
  • 5. An Ongoing Conversation
  • Bibliography
  • Index