Prohibiting chemical and biological weapons : multilateral regimes and their evolution /

With attention to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, Kelle (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Netherlands) traces the evolution of the multilateral regimes for prohibiting chemical and biological weapons (CBW). In particular, he examines the "contested compliance" of constructing and structuring regime norms amid growing biochemical and "synthetic biology" threats with dual-use potential for military or terrorist activities. This is all the more challenging given the "speed differential" between technological leap and establishing an ethical-legal framework, which warrants jettisoning "silo-thinking" for the imperative of "adaptation norm." Biological weapons prohibition regime underwent three phases: substantive norms (1975-95), institutional layering (1995-2001), and strengthening governance (2001-present), but the governance aspect was restricted by the intersessional process. While unique in "completely" prohibiting weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons prohibition regime was undermined by its "consensus-based" decision process on substantive matters, which left a staggering number of unresolved issues. Even the promising disarmament norm was stymied by leaving the target dates to the states themselves. Nevertheless, since the mid-1980s the Australia Group has strengthened the nontransfer norm (as opposed to a cooperation norm) for CBW export controls through another layer of governance. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduate, graduate, research, and professional collections. R. G. Mainuddin North Carolina Central University