Review by Booklist Review
Van der Vat's treatment of the Pacific War is lean, hard, and keenly incisive, and it moves forward with the swift and rhythmic pacing of a battle scene in a Homeric epic. His intention (and achievement) is to write a narrative analysis of the war, one that approaches the subject with a critical eye from an Olympian perspective. His approach sacrifices small details for the big picture--all in all, an excellent trade-off. Among the many pleasures the book provides are van der Vat's opinions and judgments, which are sometimes vexing, sometimes gratifying, always incisive, and usually correct. For example: MacArthur is a mountebank; Yamamoto is overrated as both a strategist and a tactician; and America should have eschewed the liberation of the Philippines in favor of a single, all-powerful thrust at Japan. To be sure, in explaining America's triumph, van der Vat errs in emphasizing the quantity and superiority of American technology while failing to take into sufficient account the bravery of the men who used it, but this is a minor annoyance. And the author is right on the mark, not to mention refreshingly at odds with multiculturalist orthodoxy, in assigning Japan--"rapacious and brutal Japan," as he describes it--most of the blame, and all of the shame, for having started the war. A valuable addition to all military collections. Includes photographs, maps, sources. Book-of-the-Month Club selection; History Book Club alternate. ~--Steve Weingartner
From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
Van der Vat ( The Atlantic Campaign ) traces the economic, diplomatic and social developments that led Japan to war in the 1930s and turned the U.S. into its main enemy in the 1940s. His fast-paced narrative, augmented with such brief personal accounts as an eyewitness report of an American POW's beheading, is related largely from the viewpoint of high-level U.S. commanders, both at the strategic level (admirals Ernest King and Chester Nimitz, Gen. Douglas MacArthur) and the tactical (admirals Raymond Spruance and William Halsey). Van der Vat is decidedly outspoken, referring to the ``willful stupidity'' of the Japanese in calling MacArthur a mountebank, and demanding to know why the Americans didn't bypass Micronesia, the Palaus and even the Philippines in their great counteroffensive. He also takes up issues long ignored: for example, MacArthur's arbitrary sidelining of the superb, battle-hardened Australian army and the British navy's attempt to ``muscle in'' on the climactic American victories. A fresh and very lively look at the war in the Pacific. BOMC selection; History Book Club alternate. (Dec.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
(c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Review by Library Journal Review
This provocative, well-written survey brings to bear a British perspective on the U.S. Navy's war with Japan. Van der Vat describes that war as a product of Japanese aggression rather than American provocation. He insists there was a significant moral gap between U.S. lapses of judgment and behavior and a Japanese ethic that justified and systemized atrocities. He also maintains the superiority of a single-front strategy to the two-pronged counterattack America actually mounted. This decision van der Vat credits to Douglas MacArthur, whom he dismisses as ``the supreme Allied confidence man.'' Even readers who disagree with van der Vat's strategic analysis will admire his skills as an operational historian. Midway and Guadalcanal, Leyte Gulf, and the submarine campaign, are described with verve and clarity, making this book especially worthwhile for general readers. Previewed in Prepub Alert, LJ 8/91, and in ``The Day of Infamy in Print,'' LJ 9/1/91.-- D.E. Showalter, U.S. Air Force Acad., Colorado Springs (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
(c) Copyright Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Review by Kirkus Book Review
A well-rounded account of the bitter WW II battles in which the US, at no small cost, put paid to Japan's Pacific ambitions. Drawing on a wealth of archival sources, van der Vat (The Atlantic Campaign, 1988; Gentleman of War, 1984) sets the stage for his hell-and-high-water narrative with a concise review of the sociopolitical and economic factors that put Japan's militant imperialists on a collision course with isolationist America. Stressing Tokyo's goal of autarky, he notes that Washington never really believed its embargoes would cause the island nation to launch a preemptive strike. It did just that at Pearl Harbor, though, paving the way for walkover conquests in the Philippines, Singapore, Guam, Indochina, and other outposts of Western empire. In the meantime, van der Vat recounts, a fighting-mad US regained its equilibrium and stemmed the Japanese tide, first at Midway, then at Guadalcanal, finally attaining easy reach of its foe's home islands before two atomic bombs obviated the necessity for an invasion. Although he offers a first-rate rundown of major campaigns, sideshows, surface-vessel engagements, and carrier clashes, van der Vat goes well beyond mere combat reportage. He provides, for example, informative briefings on summit meetings in Casablanca, Quebec, Tehran, Potsdam, and other venues that put key actions in clear perspective. He also offers thoughtful analyses that tax the Allies for failure to achieve unity of command and the Japanese for a fatal lack of strategic vision. And throughout, van der Vat focuses on the do-or-die fanaticism of Japanese troops and the atrocities they committed, at one point contrasting these perverted legacies of Bushido with the effort invested in getting a single American sailor back to the States for treatment of his wounds. A vivid, often harrowing log of a pivotal chapter in the history of naval/amphibious warfare. (Sixteen pages of photographs and maps--not seen.)
Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Review by Booklist Review
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
Review by Library Journal Review
Review by Kirkus Book Review
