Criminally ignorant : why the law pretends we know what we don't /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Sarch, Alexander, author.
Imprint:New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019.
Description:1 online resource.
Language:English
Series:Oxford scholarship online
Oxford scholarship online.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12685649
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780190056605 (ebook) : No price
Notes:Previously issued in print: 2019.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on May 16, 2019).
Summary:'Criminally Ignorant' deals with the legal fiction that we know what we don't. If you bury your head in the sand rather than learn you're committing a crime, you can be punished as if you knew. How can that be justified? This book offers a framework to explain why it's not as puzzling as it seems.
Target Audience:Specialized.
Other form:Print version : 9780190056575
Description
Summary:This is a book about the legal fiction that sometimes we know what we don't. The willful ignorance doctrine says defendants who bury their heads in the sand rather than learn they're doing something criminal are punished as if they knew. Not all legal fictions are unjustified, however. This one, used within proper limits, is a defensible way to promote the aims of the criminal law. Preserving your ignorance can make you as culpable as if you knew what you were doing, and so the interests and values protected by the criminal law can be promoted by treating you as if you had knowledge.<br> <br> This book provides a careful defense of this method of imputing mental states based on equal culpability. On the one hand, the theory developed here shows why the willful ignorance doctrine is only partly justified and requires reform. On the other hand, it demonstrates that the criminal law needs more legal fictions of this kind. Repeated indifference to the truth may substitute for knowledge, and very culpable failures to recognize risks can support treating you as if you took those risks consciously. Moreover, equal culpability imputation should also be applied to corporations, not just individuals. Still, such imputation can be taken too far. We need to determine its limits to avoid injustice. Thus, the book seeks to place equal culpability imputation on a solid normative foundation, while demarcating its proper boundaries. The resulting theory of when and why the criminal law can pretend we know what we don't has far-reaching implications for legal practice and reveals a pressing need for reform.<br>
Item Description:Previously issued in print: 2019.
Physical Description:1 online resource.
Audience:Specialized.
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9780190056605