Belief, agency, and knowledge : essays on epistemic normativity /

In Belief, Agency, and Knowledge, Chrisman (Univ. of Edinburgh, Scotland) offers a cheerful, compelling account of epistemic normativity. Knowledge, he contends, is better than other forms of belief, and because of this, he argues, one should pursue it, maintain it, and share it with others. The book is organized in three parts. Part 1 focuses on doxastic agency, or the role a believer plays in cultivating and maintaining knowledge. Part 2 focuses on the nature of epistemic norms, rational principles regarding how one ought to believe and their connection to truth. And part 3 focuses on meta-epistemology, or the meaning of epistemic discourse and terminology, and how one goes about adopting and discussing epistemic norms. Here Chrisman offers a constructivist theory of ethical norms, epistemic inferentialism, which contends that epistemic norms are not descriptive in nature but still objective. Accessible and engaging, this book tackles a difficult topic with an infectious reverence and joy. Summing Up: Recommended. Lower-division undergraduates through faculty. --William Michael Simkulet, Park University