| Summary: | "In the course of the first half of the fourteenth century one of the greatest legal minds of the day, Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313-1357), arrived at a definition of family that rested on the equation of family and propertyB-more particularly of familia and substantia. In his words, "familia accipitur in iure pro substantia." Just what was included in substantia he did not elaborate. His contemporary, Alberico da Rosciate (1290-1360), came to an identical equation, or in his terms, "familia, id est substantia."1 But he revealed more about that substantia, specifically including nonmaterial elements, dignitas and memoria, in that substance.2 Dignitas and memoria comprised such things as family name and coat of arms, size and style of dwelling, and all else that contributed to family honor, in other words. Those were all elements that members of a family shared. That sharing may have been most evident at the moments at which it ended or was under some threat, such as the very moment that was Bartolus's focus, namely death and inheritance. The ideal case was that as the nominal owner of the substantia died his son stepped forward and acceded to the substantia so seamlessly that in some sense father and son had shared the patrimony together. The tie between father and son was indeed substantial"--
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