Moral relativism and pluralism /
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| Author / Creator: | Wong, David B., author. |
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| Imprint: | Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 2023. ©2023 |
| Description: | 71 pages ; 23 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Cambridge elements. Elements in ethics Cambridge elements. Elements in ethics. |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/13150049 |
| Summary: | The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion. |
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| Physical Description: | 71 pages ; 23 cm. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 9781009044301 1009044303 9781009043496 9781009050135 |
