How does conditional aid (not) work? /

How does conditional aid (not) work? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Ramcharan, Rodney.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002.
Description:	1 online resource (25 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/02/183 IMF working paper ; WP/02/183.
Subject:	Conditionality (International relations) -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models. Economic policy -- Econometric models. Economic assistance -- Econometric models. Loans, Foreign -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models. Economic assistance -- Econometric models. Economic policy -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/13357171

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund. IMF Institute.
ISBN:	1451904681 9781451904680 1462376088 9781462376087 1452756244 9781452756240 1282107089 9781282107083 9786613800435 6613800430
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 24-25). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	Does policy conditionality worsen domestic welfare, as governments are forced to attempt unpopular reforms resulting in damaging protests, or does conditionality help implement reforms that otherwise would have been impossible? This paper analyzes these questions. Using a game-theoretic framework, it argues that the impact of conditional aid on welfare is nonmonotonic. Sufficiently conditioned aid can enhance the signaling power of reform announcements, thereby deterring protest and enabling reform. In contrast, inadequately conditioned aid may induce a "weak" government to mistakenly attempt reform, resulting in protest and a worsening of domestic welfare relative to the status quo
Other form:	Print version: Ramcharan, Rodney. How does conditional aid (not) work? [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451904680.001

Description
Summary:	Does policy conditionality worsen domestic welfare, as governments are forced to attempt unpopular reforms resulting in damaging protests, or does conditionality help implement reforms that otherwise would have been impossible? This paper analyzes these questions. Using a game-theoretic framework, it argues that the impact of conditional aid on welfare is nonmonotonic. Sufficiently conditioned aid can enhance the signaling power of reform announcements, thereby deterring protest and enabling reform. In contrast, inadequately conditioned aid may induce a "weak" government to mistakenly attempt reform, resulting in protest and a worsening of domestic welfare relative to the status quo.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (25 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 24-25).
ISBN:	1451904681 9781451904680 1462376088 9781462376087 1452756244 9781452756240 1282107089 9781282107083 9786613800435 6613800430
ISSN:	2227-8885 ;