The impact of corporate governance structures on the agency cost of debt /

The impact of corporate governance structures on the agency cost of debt /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Chan-Lau, Jorge A.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001.
Description:	1 online resource (12 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/01/204 IMF working paper ; WP/01/204.
Subject:	Corporate governance -- Econometric models. Corporate debt -- Costs -- Econometric models. Corporations -- Cost of operation -- Econometric models. Industrial management -- Econometric models. Bankruptcy -- Econometric models. Bankruptcy -- Econometric models. Corporate governance -- Econometric models. Industrial management -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/13357314

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund. International Capital Markets Department.
ISBN:	1282529331 9781282529335 9781451919080 1451919085 1462370853 9781462370856 1452701601 9781452701608 9786613821836 6613821837
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (page 12). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders.
Other form:	Print version: Chan-Lau, Jorge A. Impact of corporate governance structures on the agency cost of debt. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451919080.001

Description
Summary:	This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (12 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (page 12).
ISBN:	1282529331 9781282529335 9781451919080 1451919085 1462370853 9781462370856 1452701601 9781452701608 9786613821836 6613821837
ISSN:	2227-8885 ;