Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. International Capital Markets Department.
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| ISBN: | 1282529331
9781282529335
9781451919080
1451919085
1462370853
9781462370856
1452701601
9781452701608
9786613821836
6613821837
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (page 12).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders.
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| Other form: | Print version: Chan-Lau, Jorge A. Impact of corporate governance structures on the agency cost of debt. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451919080.001
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