Review by Choice Review
This book focuses on an important topic that intersects the fields of political science and public administration, although it has rarely been addressed in recent scholarly literature. The book extends the previous work by the authors on principal-agent theory. The authors describe the tension between political questions of power and administrative questions of effectiveness, and present a governance model that encompasses both types of questions. This model goes beyond concepts of single-agent implementation, administrative oversight, and/or control by instead positing complex networks of actors, to include both governmental and nongovernmental components (e.g., nonprofits, contractors). Moreover, this work goes beyond theory-building to introduce empirical data and testing of the governance model. The authors show that bureaucratic variables must be added to models of political relationships in order to avoid the trap of spurious correlations. That is, the study of political outcomes must include administrative factors as well as traditional predictors. Using quantitative (regression) analysis of data on school districts, the authors show how political incentives can be created to "game" bureaucratic accountability systems, a perennial concern of governance. Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, and practitioners. M. A. Saint-Germain California State University, Long Beach
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
