| Summary: | "This book sets out a Kant-inspired theory of modality, driven by a methodology which takes seriously questions about the function of modal judgment as a guide to a metaphysics of modality. It argues that we need logical modal concepts as a condition on our ability to think, and metaphysical modal concepts as a condition on our ability to think objectively. Concordant with this, it argues that logical necessity has its source in the laws of thought and that metaphysical necessity is relative to conditions on objective thought. This this account of metaphysical necessity, which is termed Modal Transcendentalism, is then further developed, covering questions concerning necessary and contingent existence, de re necessity, essentialism, and modal epistemology.The chapter introduces and defends a methodology for modal metaphysics according to which we should take seriously questions about the function of modal judgments, i.e., judgments of possibility and necessity, as an important constraint on our metaphysical theory of modality. In light of this methodology, the chapter introduces and highlights key questions concerning the function of modal judgment, and the function of judgments of logical necessity and metaphysical necessity in particular. The chapter concludes by presenting a plan of the rest of the book"--
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