The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Higashijima, Masaaki, author
Imprint:	Ann Arbor, Michigan : University of Michigan Press, [2022] ©2022
Description:	1 online resource (xxiii, 345 pages) : illustrations (49 figures, 49 tables)
Language:	English
Series:	Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.
Subject:	Elections -- Corrupt practices -- Case studies. Elections -- Corrupt practices -- Kazakhstan. Elections -- Corrupt practices -- Kyrgyzstan. Dictatorship -- Case studies. Dictatorship -- Kazakhstan. Dictatorship -- Kyrgyzstan. Dictatorship. Elections -- Corrupt practices. Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan. Electronic books. Case studies.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/13434470

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Varying Form of Title:	Electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies
Other authors / contributors:	Michigan Publishing (University of Michigan), publisher.
ISBN:	047290275X 9780472902750 9780472055319 9780472075317
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-324) and index. Open Access Sponsored by Knowledge Unlatched Information from the publisher.
Summary:	Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization.
Other form:	The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box
Standard no.:	10.3998/mpub.11978139

Table of Contents:

Part I. Puzzles and arguments
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. A theory of autocratic elections
Part II. Cross-national explorations
Chapter 3. Blatant electoral fraud
Chapter 4. Institutional manipulation
Chapter 5. Economic maneuvering
Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box
Part III. Comparative case studies
Chapter 7. From electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan
Chapter 8. From electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan
Chapter 9. Conclusion.

The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies /

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