The quality of thought /

The phenomenal intentionality of thought thesis in conjunction with an analytic phenomenology constitute the core work of Pitt's innovative response to dominant trends in both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. Pitt's concise, robust text is a refreshing response to the naturalism that has characterized much of recent philosophy, and it is a continuation of Pitt's earlier work regarding "what it is like to think that p" (p. 42). According to Pitt (California State Univ., Los Angeles), "the thesis of this book, that conceptual content is cognitive-phenomenal (together with the thesis that phenomenology is an intrinsic feature of phenomenal states) is … fundamentally incompatible" with the reigning naturalistic paradigm, externalism, and anti-individualism (p. 86). Pitt targets influential arguments by Putnam, Burge, Dretske, Fodor, Kripke, Harman, Searle, and Horgan. In the end, he concludes that "extensional semantic properties, while not quite second-class citizens, are yet dependent upon intrinsic intensional semantic properties ... When it comes to thoughts and concepts, cognitive-phenomenal content comes first" (p. 204). Philosophers of mind and language: beware. The challenge has been set and it is a formidable one. This text is supplemented by substantive footnotes. Summing Up: Recommended. Advanced undergraduates through faculty. --Heidi Storl, Augustana College (IL)