Epistemic contextualism : a defense /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Baumann, Peter, 1951- author.
Imprint:Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.
Description:1 online resource
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/13540127
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780191069253
0191069256
9780191815980
0191815985
9780198754312
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed October 10, 2016).
Summary:Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions can vary with the context of the attributor. Baumann discusses problems and objections, and provides an extension of contextualism beyond epistemology.
Other form:Print version : 9780198754312
Table of Contents:
  • Cover ; Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense; Copyright ; Acknowledgments; Contents; Introduction; Part I: Arguments ; 1: The Argument from Cases: Standard Contextualism and Standards Contextualism; 1.1 Cases for Contextualism; 1.2 Parameters: Standards; 1.2.1 Evidence, Reliability, Degrees of Belief; 1.2.2 Epistemic Position; 1.2.3 Ruling Out Alternatives; 1.3 Determinants; 1.3.1 Stakes; 1.3.2 Purposes and Intentions; 1.3.3 Conversational Contexts; 1.3.4 Salience; 1.3.5 Determinants for the Other Parameters. Norms and Conventions; 1.4 Conclusion.
  • 2: The Argument from Reliability: The Role of Reference Classes2.1 Knowledge and Reliability; 2.2 Reliability and Probability; 2.3 Reliability and Context; 2.3.1 Typing Topics; 2.3.2 Typing Methods; 2.3.3 Extension and Generalization: Reference Classes; 2.3.4 Conclusion; 2.4 Reliability and Modality; 2.5 Conclusion; 3: The Argument from Luck: The Role of Descriptions; 3.1 Luck, Its Varieties, and an Exclusion Claim; 3.2 Lucky Knowledge: Variations on a Case by Russell; 3.3 More Cases; 3.4 Modal Luck; 3.5 Probabilistic Luck; 3.6 Conclusion; Part II: Problems and Extensions.
  • 4: Skepticism, Lotteries, and Contextualist Solutions4.1 Traditional Skepticism; 4.2 Lottery Skepticism; 4.3 Knowing Lottery Propositions?; 4.4 Lotteries and Closure; 4.5 A Standard Contextualist Solution; 4.6 Another Contextualist Solution; 4.7 Conclusion; 5: Cross-Context Attributions and the Knowability Problem: Does Contextualism Lead to a Contradiction?; 5.1 Contradictions across Contexts?; 5.2 Even Worse: Moore-Paradoxality and No Neutrality; 5.3 A Problem for Contextualists Only?; 5.4 Knowability Restrictions?; 5.5 The Contextualist Way Out: Contextualist Closure; 5.6 Conclusion.
  • 6: Beyond Knowledge: Action and Responsibility6.1 A Puzzle; 6.2 Responsibility; 6.3 Reference Classes Again; 6.4 No Straight Solution; 6.5 Practical Contextualism; Part III: Objections and Alternatives; 7: Objections; 7.1 WAMs; 7.1.1 Thought and Language; 7.1.2 From WAMs to WBMs, and Back Again; 7.1.3 Conclusion; 7.2 Cappelen and Lepore's Three Tests; 7.3 More Linguistic Objections; 7.4 Cases, Again; 7.5 More Problems and Questions; 7.5.1 Complexity; 7.5.2 Normativity and Arbitrariness; 7.5.3 Error, Blindness, and the Possibility of Communication; 7.5.4 One Last Smaller Problem.
  • 8: Alternatives?8.1 Subject-Sensitive Invariantism; 8.1.1 Some Questions about Stakes; 8.1.2 SSI on Factors and Cases (Again); 8.1.3 Other Problems; 8.2 Contrastivism; 8.2.1 Knowledge without Contrasts; 8.2.2 More Relata for the Third Slot; 8.2.3 More Relativization; 8.2.4 Conclusion; 8.3 Relativism; 8.3.1 Relative Truth, Monadic Truth, and Direct Expressibility; 8.3.2 But Is It Truth?; 8.3.3 Other Problems?; 8.4 Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.