Epistemic virtue and doxastic responsibility /
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| Author / Creator: | Montmarquet, James A. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Lanham, MD : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, c1993. |
| Description: | xi, 147 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/1419938 |
Table of Contents:
- Ch. 1. Arguments for Doxastic Responsibility. The Problem Defined. Truth, Justification, and Responsibility. Action, Responsibility, and Belief. Ethics: Subjective and Objective Justification. An Argument of Roderick Chisholm. Belief and Intellectual Character
- Ch. 2. Epistemic Virtue. Conscientiousness and Virtue. Epistemic Virtues: A Preliminary Catalogue. Epistemic Virtues: Their Epistemic Status. The Goals of Epistemic Life. Virtues and Capacities: Motivations of the View to Be Developed
- Ch. 3. Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility I. Sketch of a Theory. Deontology, Consequentialism, and Epistemic Virtue. Direct Doxastic Responsibility. The Kantian Analogy. Responsibility and "Avoidability"
- Ch. 4. Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility II. The Range of Doxastic Responsibility. Epistemic Negligence. Further Problems. A Dialogue with the Cardinal
- Ch. 5. Doxastic Voluntariness. Weak (Analogical) Doxastic Voluntariness. Strong Doxastic Voluntariness. Acceptance, Assent, and Belief
- Ch. 6. Epistemic Virtue and Justification. Character and Normative Judgment. Virtue and Justification. Virtue and Justification Continued. Toward a Unified Normative Science: Ethics and Epistemology. Appendix One: Descartes and Doxastic Freedom. Preliminary Reflections. The "Non-Neutral" Will. Will and Understanding. Belief and the Will. Unrestricted Voluntarism. Direct versus Indirect Cartesian Voluntarism. Appendix Two: Normative Epistemology.