Epistemic virtue and doxastic responsibility /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Montmarquet, James A.
Imprint:Lanham, MD : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, c1993.
Description:xi, 147 p. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Series:Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/1419938
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ISBN:084767763X (hard : alk. paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Ch. 1. Arguments for Doxastic Responsibility. The Problem Defined. Truth, Justification, and Responsibility. Action, Responsibility, and Belief. Ethics: Subjective and Objective Justification. An Argument of Roderick Chisholm. Belief and Intellectual Character
  • Ch. 2. Epistemic Virtue. Conscientiousness and Virtue. Epistemic Virtues: A Preliminary Catalogue. Epistemic Virtues: Their Epistemic Status. The Goals of Epistemic Life. Virtues and Capacities: Motivations of the View to Be Developed
  • Ch. 3. Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility I. Sketch of a Theory. Deontology, Consequentialism, and Epistemic Virtue. Direct Doxastic Responsibility. The Kantian Analogy. Responsibility and "Avoidability"
  • Ch. 4. Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility II. The Range of Doxastic Responsibility. Epistemic Negligence. Further Problems. A Dialogue with the Cardinal
  • Ch. 5. Doxastic Voluntariness. Weak (Analogical) Doxastic Voluntariness. Strong Doxastic Voluntariness. Acceptance, Assent, and Belief
  • Ch. 6. Epistemic Virtue and Justification. Character and Normative Judgment. Virtue and Justification. Virtue and Justification Continued. Toward a Unified Normative Science: Ethics and Epistemology. Appendix One: Descartes and Doxastic Freedom. Preliminary Reflections. The "Non-Neutral" Will. Will and Understanding. Belief and the Will. Unrestricted Voluntarism. Direct versus Indirect Cartesian Voluntarism. Appendix Two: Normative Epistemology.