Kant and the mind /
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| Author / Creator: | Brook, Andrew |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | New York : Cambridge University Press, 1994. |
| Description: | xii, 327 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/1565777 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- 1. The contemporary relevance of Kant's work
- 1. Kant's contribution
- 2. Kant, functionalism, and cognitive science
- 3. The resistance of materialists
- 2. Kant's theory of the subject
- 1. The need for a subject
- 2. 'One single experience': the unity of experience
- 3. Kant's doctrine of synthesis
- 4. The unity of consciousness
- 5. The kind of unity we have
- 6. Tying it all together: the mind as a representation
- 3. Kant's conception of awareness and self-awareness
- 1. Defining 'Bewusstsein': outer and inner sense
- 2. Two forms of self-awareness
- 3. 'Bewusstsein': awareness without self-awareness?
- 4. What is special about apperceptive self-awareness?
- 4. Kant's theory of apperceptive self-awareness
- 1. Transcendental designation: the referential base of self-awareness
- 2. The sources of self-awareness
- 3. The global representation: theory of the representational base
- 4. Why apperceptive self-awareness is the way it is
- 5. Coda: transcendental and empirical aspects of the self
- 5. The mind in the Critique of Pure Reason
- 1. Kant's critical project and how the mind fits into it
- 2. The location of the subjective deduction in the first edition
- 3. The attack on the Paralogisms in the first edition: synthesis and self-awareness
- 4. The mind and its awareness of itself in the second edition
- 5. The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism
- 6. Interpretive perplexities
- 6. The first-edition subjective deduction: the object of 'one experience'
- I. Synthesis and Unity
- 1. What is a subjective deduction, and why did Kant offer one?
- 2. Kitcher and Kant's doctrine of synthesis
- 3. Apprehension, reproduction, and recognition in concepts
- 4. Apperception and the unity of individual objects
- 5. Transcendental apperception: the unity of 'all appearances'
- 6. Synchronic unity
- II. The Strange Case of Self-Awareness and the Deduction
- 1. Apperception and self-awareness
- 2. Why did Kant introduce self-awareness into the deduction?
- 7. Kant's diagnosis of the Second Paralogism
- 1. The Paralogisms
- 2. Three claims from the subjective deduction
- 3. The introductory remarks: the strategies of rational psychology
- 4. The arguments for the Second Paralogism
- 5. The fourth part of Kant's discussion
- 8. The Third Paralogism: unity without identity over time
- 1. Situating the Third Paralogism
- 2. The structure of Kant's discussion
- 3. Does unity or memory require identity?
- 4. Kant and Hume versus Butler and Reid, and Strawson, too
- 5. To what extent is the unity of consciousness diachronic?
- 6. Unity as the form of thought: 'time is...in me'
- 7. Identifying the subject with an object
- 8. Results and attitude
- 9. The second-edition subjective deduction: self-representing representations
- 1. Homunculi and self-representing representations
- 2. The second-edition Transcendental Deduction
- 3. [section]15: synthesis in the second edition
- 4. [section]16 and [section]17: the new version of the central argument
- 5. The mind as representation
- 6. Self-representation and self-awareness
- 7. Mind as representation: final considerations
- 10. Nature and awareness of the self
- 1. What the subject is and what we can know about it
- 2. Is a subject merely a formal requirement?
- 3. [section]18: empirical versus transcendental apperception; foundationalism
- 4. [section]24 and [section]25: self-awareness and the noumenal mind
- 5. Why immediate awareness of the noumenal mind is not knowledge
- 6. Why did Kant claim that we are immediately aware of the noumenal mind?
- 7. Coda: the mind in the two versions of the deduction
- 8. Concluding remarks
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index of passages cited
- General index