Substances and universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics /

Scaltsas understands Aristotle's theory of substance as developing out of problems concerning the nature of predication, which first arise in Plato's Phaedo. Roughly, if by belonging to x, F-ness determines the nature of x, then x is itself an F; by contrast, if F-ness belongs to x without determining its nature, then x will itself be F without being an F. (Thus, if F-ness is being a tree, whatever is F counts as a tree. If F-ness is being large, then x will be large without being, so to speak, a large.) After a false start in the Categories, Scaltsas argues, Aristotle eventually reaches the conclusion in the Metaphysics that it is wrong to suppose that essences belong to subjects at all. Rather, in some cases, essences are the subjects themselves. Consequently, problems about predication initially posed by Platonic assumptions dissolve. Organized around this central theme are rich discussions of potentiality, actuality, particularity, and universality. Although focusing principally on Aristotle, Scaltsas conducts his discussions with an eye on treatments of analogous problems by contemporary metaphysicians. A fresh look at the tangled texts of the middle books of the Metaphysics, this is an intelligent, philosophically vivid portrait of Aristotle, complementing some other recent studies--e.g., Michael J. Loux's Primary Ousia (CH, Apr'92) and Mary Louise Gill's Aristotle on Substance (CH, Jun'90)--by offering well motivated interpretive alternatives. Highly recommended for all academic libraries. Upper-division undergraduate; graduate; faculty. C. J. Shields; University of Colorado at Boulder