Closing with the enemy : how GIs fought the war in Europe, 1944-1945 /

A half-century after the end of WW II, the conduct of the conflict against the Axis powers is still debated. Did the US achieve victory by crushing the foe with overwhelming mat'eriel force? How good was American generalship? Were American ground forces the equal of the enemy? Focusing on the land war with Germany from Normandy to the Rhine crossing at Remagen, Doubler, a military officer and historian, addresses these and other questions, and gives a positive view of Americans at war. According to Doubler, the US Army gathered combat expertise in the North African and Italian campaigns from late 1942 to mid-1944. In pivotal battles across France and into Germany, American soldiers and commanders demonstrated initiative and skill in overcoming a variety of battlefield obstacles, becoming a first-class fighting force along the way. The accomplishments of the army reflected the values of American society: "soldiers coming from a democratic society that promoted competitiveness and progress were more bold and confident in their ability to generate and implement new combat techniques." Although some readers may find Doubler's generally laudatory account of Americans in action questionable, his analysis, buttressed with special reports, studies, and secondary sources, will interest professional and amateur audiences alike. The book contains useful statistical information, maps, tables, illustrations, contemporary photographs, and appendixes. All levels. C. L. Egan; University of Houston

Countering the widely held belief that U.S. forces in Europe-often viewed as inferior to their German counterparts-prevailed in WWII because of a preponderance of material resources, Doubler's study reveals that Gen. Dwight Eisenhower's divisions had to overcome substantial shortages of personnel and material. Their success, he demonstrates, was due largely to their coordinated use of infantry, tanks, artillery, air power and military engineers. Tracing their advance from Normandy into Germany, Doubler's clear account shows how the Army's tactics validated then-current doctrines while at the same time the troops learned how to apply new principles of combined-arms warfare. His main argument-that U.S. Army forces in Europe were more effective than is generally recognized-is convincing. One chapter analyzes the publications of notable military writers Russell Weigley, Martin Van Creveld and S.L.A. Marshall, whose views differ from his. Doubler has taught at West Point and is currently stationed at Army headquarters in Washington, D.C. Illustrations. (Dec.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

For years, the traditional view has been that U.S. ground forces defeated the veteran German Wehrmacht only because of enormous American resources and massive firepower. Doubler, a professional military scholar and West Point instructor, takes a contrary position: America's wartime army prevailed because it was innovative and supremely adaptable, able to learn from its mistakes and quickly revise its tactics. Doubler's view is persuasive; he presents example after example of units absorbing combat lessons in the midst of battle and changing their strategy while under fire. This important book is a watershed in critical thinking that will be cited for years to come. Fluently written and beautifully detailed, it is essential for a complete understanding of American operations in World War II. Highly recommended for public and academic libraries.-Raymond L. Puffer, U.S. Air Force History Prog., Edwards AFB, Cal. (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.