Nature's imagination : the frontiers of scientific vision /

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Bibliographic Details
Imprint:Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Pr., 1995.
Description:xii, 212 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/1743174
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Dyson, Freeman J.
Cornwell, John C., 1944-
ISBN:0198517750 : $23.00
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Review by Choice Review

This group of 13 papers arose from a Cambridge University symposium concerning the themes of "reduction" and the "future of science." The contributors are accomplished in several areas of science: physics (e.g., Freeman Dyson and Roger Penrose), physiology (Gerald Edelman), cognitive science (P. and P. Churchland), and related areas such as medicine, artificial life, and mathematics. Although the papers do implicitly adhere to the theme of reduction (pro or anti), there was little interaction among the participants, so that one sees a disparate collection of research directions, such as logical and computational adjustments to alleged G"odelian and Turing limitations, genetic algorithm versions of cellular automata models of artificial life, or enthusiastic projections of unified "theories of everything," usually better presented in the popular works that earned these contributors their invitation to the symposium. None of the participants adequately addresses the philosophy of reduction itself--or the relation of their agendas to attendant philosophical criticism. Quite entertaining as "popular science" for curious undergraduates, but not particularly full of real clues to future research programs. General; undergraduate. P. D. Skiff; Bard College

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Booklist Review

In 1992, world-class mathematicians and scientists gathered to challenge the primacy of scientific reductionism. Dyson's historical perspective notes the failures of reductionism but also recalls stunning successes; for example, given the Schr\x9a dinger and Dirac equations, "many of the bewildering complexities of chemistry and physics were reduced to two lines of algebraic symbols." Most of the papers, however, reflect views analogous to Penrose's belief in the "unlikelihood of mathematicians acting in accordance with an unconscious, unknowable algorithm," and Edelman's conviction that "a person is not explained in molecular, field-theoretical, or physiological terms alone." Because these papers were written by and for highly specialized scientists, the lay reader may find many of the arguments impenetrable. Entirely readable exceptions include Midgley's ethical objections to "reductive megalomania" and Atkins' powerful statement on the irreconcilability of science and religion, in which he extols the reduction of the complex to the simple. --Brenda Grazis

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Review by Library Journal Review

These 13 essays critically explore the advantages and disadvantages of classic reductionism in terms of understanding and appreciating computer mathematics, the ongoing mind-body problem, and the ultimate nature of this evolving universe. Against the background of Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem and Gerald Edelman's neuroscience research, the reader learns about those new concepts, models, and issues that surround modern scientific and mathematical inquiry. The dynamic relationship between the complex brain and the flow of self-consciousness still eludes an empirical explanation, but continued advances in computer science and holistic biology may shed more light on this enigma. Of special interest are the contributions of Peter W. Atkins on the omnicompetence of science, John D. Barrow on the challenge of a phsyical theory of everything, and Roger Penrose on irreducibility in mathematics. Other topics treated include memory, randomness, neural Darwinism, and artifical intelligence. Recommended for all academic history and philosophy of science collections.‘H. James Birx, Canisius Coll., Buffalo, N.Y. (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

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Review by Kirkus Book Review

Erudite essays that explore the pros and cons of reductionism in science. There have been rumblings in the halls of academe that reductionism--in which the whole is explained by a dissection of its parts--will not remain the dominant mode of doing science. Biologists speak of the need for ``integrative biology''; medicine has its adherents of ``holistic'' approaches. To explore the issue, Cornwell, director of the Science and Human Dimension Project at Jesus College, Cambridge University, assembled a stellar cast of scientists and philosophers for a 1992 symposium. Physicist Freeman Dyson leads off with an essay describing scientists as artists striving against a given culture; he also stumps for multiple visions rather than a single vision of science. There follow a number of essays describing how the turn-of-the-century vision to reduce all of mathematics to a few pure axioms was blown out of the water by the intricate theorems of Kurt Gödel. Astronomer John Barrow casts doubt on theories of everything and the concept that the universe is a continuum, while Roger Penrose states themes that are later repeated in a series of essays on neuroscience and artificial intelligence. These have to do with whether mind equals brain, whether the brain is a computer, and what is meant by computability. There is steep sledding with Nobelist Gerald Edelman and colleague Giolio Tononi's exposition of the theory of neuronal group selection--steep enough to require a following explanatory essay by none other than Oliver Sacks. The upshot is that, with the exception of a couple of spirited voices championing reductionism, the authors declare, ``The king is dead, long live the replacement''--which Edelman, in a concluding essay far more pithy than his first, describes as a ``second'' enlightenment that can celebrate human freedom. Some nuggets here for philosophers of science, neuroscientists, mathematicians, and computer folks--but one wonders if maybe Cornwell didn't stack the deck a bit and if a different cast might have come up with a different consensus.

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