Code-name downfall : the secret plan to invade Japan and why Truman dropped the bomb /

Complementing Stanley Weintraub's excellent The Last Great Victory [BKL Ap 15 95], this well-shaped work outlines the course that the brass thought the fighting would take through late 1946, the time slated for Japan's defeat. Scenarios ranged from the enemy's sudden collapse to its suicidal resistance, ala Okinawa. The Americans knew from codebreaking that the former was not likely and that the latter was certain if an invasion was ordered. Key to the planning, and the subsequent controversy over the atomic bomb, was the expected scale of American casualties. The authors review the estimates, the upper range of which compelled the search for an alternative to a ground battle. Here, Allen and Polmar deploy their complete research by describing the generals' thinking about B-29 bombings, about landing beaches and deception schemes, and about what tactical weapons to use: these might have included poison gas, so anxious were the Americans to minimize casualties. A Japanese plan for maximizing the bloodbath, using the kamikaze, gas, and germ warfare, portended a frightful crescendo that fortunately remains speculative, but this encompassing narrative--fit for all libraries--constitutes the war's "unwritten" final chapter.--Gilbert Taylor

Historians have challenged President Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, claiming that the war with Japan could have been ended by negotiations. Allen and Polmar (Rickover: Controversy and Genius) counter that the Japanese were not ready to surrender until after the second bomb was dropped. Accordingly, massive Allied landings on Japan's home islands thus remained a probability until very late in the war. The secret plan for this invasion, along with the Japanese plan for opposing it, are presented here for the first time. Experts predicted that the Americans would suffer at least half a million casualties, while critics have suggested that this figure was inflated to justify dropping the bomb. The authors have uncovered evidence to support the prediction: for example, the requisition of 370,000 Purple Heart medals by the Quartermaster Corps, indicating the number of wounded expected; 130,000 killed in action would fit the average war dead/wounded ratio, for a total of about 500,000 casualties. Finally, Allen and Polmar convincingly argue that Truman actively sought ways to end the conflict at the lowest cost of American and Japanese lives. This is a convincing case to settle a long-running controversy. History Book Club alternate. (July) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

In their latest book, Allen and Polmar (World War II, America at War 1941-1945, LJ 2/1/92) contribute to a growing number of works examining key events of World War II from a 50-year perspective. The authors examine individuals and issues involved in planning the massive invasion of Japan in the fall of 1945, as U.S. troops were mobilized to engage an enemy prepared to fight to the death to defend their homeland. Only the quick surrender of Japan following the dropping of the atomic bomb prevented what would have been the largest operation of the war. Established authors with many books of military history to their credit, Allen and Polmar provide an authoritative, detailed account of the final push to defeat of Japan. Among the may books on the subject published this season, theirs argues strongly for the necessity of dropping the bomb. An excellent work that would have been improved only by the valuable addition of maps; recommended for all libraries.‘Robert Favini, Bentley Coll. Lib., Waltham, Mass. (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

This grim and painstaking analysis of plans for operations Olympic and Coronet (the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu) argues that dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a military necessity that hastened the end of WW II and saved possibly millions of Japanese and American lives. Military experts Allen and Polmar (Merchants of Treason, 1988, etc.) build a persuasive case. Though Japanese forces had not won an engagement with the US since the war's first months, and defeat looked increasingly inevitable, the leaders of imperial Japan repeatedly vowed to fight US forces to the last man, woman, and child. The islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, not nearly as well defended as the Japanese home islands, had to be conquered in savage battles that lasted months and resulted in tens of thousands of American casualties. Allied demands for unconditional surrender were not an obstacle to peace, the authors argue; Americans were willing to permit Japan to retain the imperial system and to go on with its normal national life, but Japanese leaders rejected the offer. The morale and zeal of ordinary citizens to carry on the fight were high, even after American firebombings that claimed more lives than the atomic bombs would. The authors describe Olympic and Coronet in ghastly detail, noting that they might have resulted in more than 500,000 American casualties, as well as in the use of chemical and biological weapons by both sides. They conclude that, in making the decision to drop the atomic bombs, ``Truman was looking for ways to end the conflict honorably and at the lowest possible cost in American and Japanese lives.'' (For another look at this period, see Stanley Weintraub, The Last Great Victory, p. 624.) The authors' masterful marshalling of the evidence prompts relief that the invasion of Japan never took place, but it's unlikely to put to rest historical speculation about the morality of Truman's decision. (photos, not seen)