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|a Hackett, Stuart C.
|q (Stuart Cornelius)
|0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n84162276
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| 245 |
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|a The resurrection of theism;
|b prolegomena to Christian apology.
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| 260 |
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|a Chicago,
|b Moody Press
|c [1957]
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| 300 |
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|a 381 pages
|c 24 cm
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|b txt
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| 504 |
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|a Includes bibliographical references.
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|a I. The meaning of rational empiricism -- Brief statement of the position -- Primary meaning -- Subsidiary Implications -- Critical Exposition of the Kantian Theory -- Positive formulation -- A priori categories -- Derivation of the categories from the types of logical judgment -- Limitations of the categories -- Critical alteration -- Introductory remarks -- The numerical reduction of the categories -- the application of the categories beyond the realm of sense -- the application of the categories to the knowledge of things -- in themselves -- Conclusion, -- II. Positive defense of the synthetic a priori nature of the categorical structure -- The basic argument -- Intelligible experience presupposes the synthetic a priori -- The denial of the synthetic a priori is either self-contradictory or meaningless -- Illustrations -- Conclusion -- III. An answer to objections against rational empiricism -- Introduction -- From the vantage point of rationalism -- the objection stated -- The objection answered -- Positive objections to the rationalistic position -- Answer to Plato's arguments -- From the vantage points of Empiricism -- The empirical assertion -- Its general character -- Its detailed exposition -- The empirical compromise -- The argument of Lewis -- Conclusion -- From the vantage point of pragmatism -- Formulation of the objections -- Refutation of the objections -- First objection: general refutation -- First objection: specific applications of the refutation -- Second objection -- Conclusion -- IV. Corollaries of rational empiricism -- Concerning Epistemology proper -- First Corollary: Epistemological dualism -- Formulation of the theory -- Proposed alternatives -- Conclusion -- Second Corollary: The Coherence Theory of Truth -- Formulation of the theory -- Definition and meaning -- Relation of the theory to epistemological Dualism -- Answer to objections -- Proposed alternatives -- The correspondence theory of truth -- The pragmatic theory of truth -- Conclusion -- Concerning the relation of epistemology to metaphysics -- The logical primacy of epistemology -- The establishment of a common ground -- V. The empirical approach -- Objective empiricism: the Roman Catholic position: Thomism -- Formulation of the position -- The general nature of knowledge -- Summary statement -- The factors of knowledge -- The process of knowledge -- The resultant knowledge of God -- Knowledge of God through His effects -- The analogy of being -- Conclusion -- Criticism of objective empiricism -- Of the general theory of knowledge -- Of the knowledge of God -- Conclusion- -Subjective Empiricism- -Formulation of the position- -Summary statement- -The liberal spokesman: D.C. Macintosh- -General epistemology- -religious epistemology- -- The Neo-orthodox spokesmen: Baillie, Barth, Brunner- -- Denial of the inferential knowledge of God- -Positive doctrine of divine encounter- -- Criticism of the position- -Of the general position- -- Of the position as expounded by Macintosh- -Of the position as expounded by Neo-orthodoxy- -Conclusion, --
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|a XI. The Teleological Argument: the Argument from the Nature of Total Existence- -General nature of the argument- -Formulation of the argument: macrocosmic point of view- -Introduction- -Analysis of the areas of adaption- -The fitness of inorganic in the production and maintenance of life- -the argument stated- -The possibility of chance- -The internal adaptedness of organic beings- -the argument stated- -The possibility of chance- -The intelligibility of the World and its instrumentality in the realization of humanly provisioned ends- -The argument stated- -The possibility of chance- -- The temporal progressiveness of the cosmic process- -Conclusion- -Formulation of the argument: Microcosmic point of view- -Introduction- -The metaphysical argument: from the nature of mind- -The naturalistic view of mind- -materialism or behaviorism- -Functionalism- -The ultimate explanation of mind- -The moral argument: from the nature of obligation and value- -Summary of the argument- -First premise- -Second premise- -Conclusion- -Proposed alternatives to the moral argument- -Attack on the first premise- -positivism- -Relativism or subjectivism- -Attack on the second premise- -Logical Idealism -- Postulationism- -Conclusion- -Conclusion on the teleological argument- -- XII. The Transcendental Argument of Mysticism Introduction- -The transcendental argument of mysticism- -The argument stated- -The argument criticized- -Difficulties of the position- -- The objection is either self-contradictory or meaningless- -The assertion, that God is unknowable by intellect but knowable by experience, embodies a basic confusion- -The theory involves a double self-contradiction- -- Conclusion- -- XIII. The Expansive- -Limiting Argument of Presuppositionalism- -The argument that God is finite: Summary of the argument- -First ground of finitude in God: the finiteness of the effect to be Explained- -Statement of the argument- -Refutation of the argument- -Second ground of finitude in God: the reciprocal character of any argument from experience- -Statement of the argument- -- Refutation of the argument- -Conclusion- -- XIV. The Reductive Argument of Immanuel Kant- -The reductive character of the Kantian objection- -Analysis and criticism of the first reduction: the argument from the antinomies- -The general thesis- -First antinomy: the World both has and has not a Beginning in time- -Statement of Kant's argument- -Answer to the argument- -Conclusion concerning the first reduction- -Analysis and Criticism of the second reduction: the argument from dependence on the ontological proof- -Summary of Kant's argument- -Reduction of the teleological argument to the cosmological -- Statement of the reduction- -Answer to the argument- -Conclusion on the Kantian criticism of argumentative theism-
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|a XV. The Destructive Argument of Critical Naturalism- -Preliminary considerations- -An answer to the objections against the cosmological argument- -Logical objections- -Because it presupposes that nature must satisfy the intellect- -Because it transfers, to the sphere of objective existence, the concept of necessity, which belongs only to the sphere of logical validity- -- Because it involves the fallacy of composition- -because it concludes a clause whose relation to the temporal series is unintelligible- -Metaphysical objections- -Because it assumes the universality of the casual law- -Because it involves a nonscientific concept of causation- -Because it fails to explain why God Himself does not need an extraneous cause- -Because an infinite series of cause and effects is possible- -Because the concept of a dynamic universe in process may be taken as given- -Because the existence of the universe may be explained in terms of aboriginal becoming or creativity- -- Because the argument proves only necessity of causation and not necessity of existence- -Because the material (phenomenal) universe or some part of it may be the absolutely necessary being- -Because the ground of the universe might be epistemological rather than metaphysical- -Conclusion- -An answer to the objections against the teleological argument- -Mode of approach- -- Logical objections- -Because any arrangement of existing elements is almost infinitely improbable: so that no argument can be based on the complexity of conspiring cause- -Because it commits the fallacy of consequent- -Epistemological objections- -Because the design argument does no more than make explanation in terms of intelligence a possibility- -Because the inference to design is justifiable only on the basis of a past experience of association: and we have no such experience, either of the world as a whole or of the particular instances of design in it- -Because the argument from the progressive realization of ends is purely anthropomorphic and anthropocentric- -Because any give entity has no single function and hence not a single purpose- -Because the teleological principle is practically barren- -Metaphysical objections- -Because the apparent presence of design and purpose may conceivably have resulted from the chance interaction of elements in a material base -- Because the argument, if valid, does not involve theism in the fullest sense- -The ethical objection- -- Formulation of the objection- -Immediate logical possibilities for a solution- -First set of solutions: by alteration of the concept of evil- -Naturalism- -Pessimism- -Finitism- -Nescientism- -Second set of solutions: by alteration of the concept of evil- -Illusionism- -Instrumentalism- -Third type of solution: Irrationalism: the denial of rational capacity as a mode for solving the problem- -- Conclusion on the immediate logical possibilities of solution- -The proposed solution of the problem of evil- -Preliminary considerations- -Brief statement of the solution- -General implications of the proposed solution- -Detailed application of the principles to the problem of evil- -Application of the principles- -Conclusion on the ethical objection- -conclusion on the objections to the teleological argument- -Conclusion on the whole destructive argument of critical naturalism.
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|a Theism.
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|i Online version:
|a Hackett, Stuart C. (Stuart Cornelius).
|t Resurrection of theism.
|d Chicago, Moody Press [1957]
|w (OCoLC)644472312
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