Competition policy : a game-theoretic perspective /
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| Author / Creator: | Phlips, Louis. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1995. |
| Description: | xvi, 272 p. : ill. ; 23 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/2335684 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1. Preliminaries
- Part I. Explicit Collusion
- 2. Four are few and six are many
- 3. Cartel laws are good for business
- 4. Cartel enforcement
- Part II. Tacit Collusion
- 5. Information sharing among oligopolists
- 6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes
- 7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism
- 8. Collusion detection
- Part III. Semicollusion
- 9. Excess capacity and collusion
- 10. Collusion in R & D
- Part IV. Predatory Pricing
- 11. Predation in theory
- 12. Evidence on predation
- 13. Antitrust implications