In confidence : Moscow's ambassador to American's six Cold War presidents (1962-1986) /

Dobrynin's memoirs of his 24 years as Moscow's ambassador to the US are an indispensable resource for Cold War history on three levels. First, they provide accounts of such consequential events as the Berlin and German question, the Cuban missile crisis, the war in Vietnam, strategic arms limitations negotiations, and the series of Middle East crises, among others. Second, they offer an anecdotal view of many Soviet leaders and policy makers, e.g., Stalin, Khrushchev, Gromyko, Brezhnev, Gorbachev. These vignettes are characterized by their candor and forthrightness. Third, the memoirs also reveal insight into American personalities; juicy stories are imbedded throughout the volume. At one point, then Vice President George Bush told Dobrynin that Ronald Reagan "found it hard simultaneously to think and to express his own ideas," when advising the Soviet ambassador to give the president time to digest Soviet positions in the impending Geneva summit. Of Robert Kennedy, Dobrynin writes he was "far from being a social person ... lacked a proper sense of humor ... impulsive and excitable," as he chronicles their meetings during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In another instance, the otherwise unflappable Henry Kissinger curses and slams down the telephone receiver. Perhaps Dobrynin's major failing is a larger analysis. Mikhail Gorbachev was not responsible for the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. Rather, as Dobrynin notes, it took nearly one-third of a century for both powers to understand the costliness, destructiveness, and irrationality of the Cold War. All levels. C. W. Haury; Piedmont Virginia Community College

For nearly a quarter of a century (1962^-86), Dobrynin was the USSR's ambassador to the U.S. By establishing and maintaining one-on-one relationships of mutual trust with key players in each U.S. administration (and with the leaders and foreign ministers of his own government), Dobrynin operated a "confidential channel" between the leaders of the rival superpowers that no doubt helped keep the cold war from incinerating the planet. The Soviet ambassador's role in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis is well known; what he supplies here is fascinating detail about the role of secret diplomacy over several decades of U.S.-Soviet relations, as well as a thoughtful observer's assessment of the U.S. and Russian leaders and advisers whose communications he mediated. Readers who snap up the memoirs of U.S. negotiators such as Kissinger and Vance should value Dobrynin's view from the other side of the cold war fence. --Mary Carroll

This diplomatic history by the former Soviet ambassador to the U.S. from 1962 to 1986 casts the Cold War as a saga of missed opportunities and misunderstandings. Dobrynin believes that the ideologies of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. perpetuated a wasteful, dangerous rivalry, and he blames the collapse of détente on the growing influence of the Soviet military-industrial complex, Moscow's overextension (e.g., in Afghanistan), U.S. inflexibility in arms control and President Ronald Reagan's bellicosity. Paradoxically, Dobrynin also credits Reagan for opening a dialogue with Moscow during his second term. Drawing on his own unpublished diaries and archival research, the ex-ambassador charges that during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Moscow made him an involuntary tool of deceit by keeping secret the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. He also divulges that President Lyndon Johnson pushed for a negotiated end to the Vietnam War in 1965 whereby the U.S. would accept any government in South Vietnam, even if it eventually turned socialist. This monumental chronicle is a fundamental source on Soviet-American relations. Photos not seen by PW. Author tour. (Sept.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States from the Kennedy through Reagan administrations, here recounts vividly the many frightening Cold War episodes that linger in the collective memory of the international community. In moderate language, the diplomat who strove above all to maintain cordial relations between the two superpowers discusses the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, Afghanistan, and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The book's title refers to the "confidential channel" that began with Dobrynin and Bobby Kennedy testing each other out with ideas and fresh proposals via a more informal communications network. This channel bypassed much of the traditional foreign policy-making bureaucracy of both countries and allowed for greater flexibility among negotiators. Dobrynin's memoir reads surprisingly well for this type of book, even as he goes into detail about specific meetings, crises, and American and Soviet personalities. His opinions of the individual American presidents and foreign policy leaders may challenge one's notion of Cold War political heroes and goats. Highly recommended for larger public and all academic libraries. [Previewed in Prepub Alert, LJ 6/1/95.]‘Stephen W. Green, Auraria Lib., Denver (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the US from 1962 to 1986, doesn't tell all, but he tells enough to give a fascinating and indispensable account of the relations between the Soviet Union and the US during his tenure. Dobrynin began his career towards the end of WW II, when Stalin instructed Molotov to find more candidates for the Foreign Ministry among young engineers; Dobrynin, an engineer in an aircraft factory, was plucked out and told to present himself for new duties. By 1952, with a mind ``clogged by the long years of Stalinism, by our own ideological blunders,'' he became counsellor in the embassy in Washington, and in 1962 he was appointed ambassador. By his flexibility, his ability to improvise, and his readiness to provide as well as seek out information, he soon established a remarkable rapport with a series of presidents and their advisors. He not only gives details of the major negotiations, but conveys an unusual perspective on the individuals involved: He describes a Soviet leadership ``almost as exasperated at Hanoi's determination and secretiveness as Washington''; a drunken Brezhnev telling President Nixon the most sensitive details of behind-the-scenes Kremlin relationships; how Nixon was ``essentially rather irresolute''; Carter's relations with Moscow were not guided by clear priorities or a sense of long-term implications of actions; and Reagan was ``much deeper . . . than he first appeared,'' though he ``had a poor conception of our relations and did not like examining their intricacies''; and the author portrays the ``stagnation of thought, ideological inertia, and lack of flexibility'' of the Soviet Politburo. Dobrynin makes no bones about being a communist and finds it difficult to understand the revulsion inspired by the Soviet Union's record, but his candor, his extraordinary ability, and his sharp perceptions make this book an entertaining and important one. (Author tour)