The Cuban missile crisis : the struggle over policy /

Hilsman offers an interesting interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. As a former aide to John F. Kennedy he admits his fondness for the former president. His interpretation of how Kennedy handled the crisis conforms neatly with his To Move a Nation (CH, May'68) and the interpretations of Robert Kennedy and Graham Allison. What is interesting is Hilsman's view of the reasons behind the crisis. He disputes the accusation that Soviet missiles were sent to Cuba to prop up Fidel Castro. Instead, he argues that missiles were sent to correct a strategic imbalance between the US and the Soviet Union. Nikita Khruschev, he maintains, was painfully aware of American nuclear superiority and attempted to create a "missile gap in reverse" by placing Soviet missiles closer to the US. Recognizing this, Kennedy framed a policy aimed at removing the missiles but not Castro. Hilsman depicts Kennedy as tirelessly restraining "hawks," within and outside the administration, who agitated for an invasion. Bias aside, this is an interesting and well-documented account. All levels. D. R. Turner Davis and Elkins College