Language, thought, and consciousness : an essay in philosophical psychology /
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| Author / Creator: | Carruthers, Peter, 1952- |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 1996. |
| Description: | xv, 291 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/2444475 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1. The geography of the issues
- 1.1. Conceptual versus natural modality
- 1.2. Implications for philosophy and psychology
- 1.3. Of wolves and wolf-children
- 1.4. Stalnaker's intelligent Martians
- 1.5. Anti-realist arguments
- 1.6. Realism in mind
- 1.7. Innateness and theory of mind
- 1.8. Thinking: images or sentences?
- 2. Which language do we think with?
- 2.1. The evidence from scientific psychology
- 2.2. The evidence of introspection: images and imaged sentences
- 2.3. The scope and strength of the introspective thesis
- 2.4. Objections and elucidations
- 2.5. Fallible introspection and Fodor
- 2.6. Individuating propositional attitudes
- 2.7. Animals and infants
- 2.8. Language-learning and sub-personal thought
- 3. Thought-based semantics
- 3.1. The argument from foreign believers
- 3.2. Grice's thought-based semantics
- 3.3. Two objections
- 3.4. Searle's version of thought-based semantics
- 3.5. A marriage of Searle and Fodor?
- 3.6. Causal co-variance theories
- 3.7. Misrepresentation, and asymmetric causal dependence
- 3.8. The all Ss problem
- 4. Holism and language
- 4.1. From mental realism to Mentalese
- 4.2. The demand for scientific vindication
- 4.3. The problem of holism
- 4.4. Between holism and atomism
- 4.5. Arguments for holism
- 4.6. The need for a language-based semantics
- 4.7. Language-based semantics 1: functional-role semantics
- 4.8. Language-based semantics 2: canonical acceptance conditions
- 5. First steps towards a theory of consciousness
- 5.1. Retrospect: the need for a theory of consciousness
- 5.2. Conscious versus non-conscious mental states
- 5.3. Cartesian consciousness
- 5.4. Why Cartesianism won't do
- 5.5. What kind of theory do we want?
- 5.6. Kirk: presence to central decision-making
- 5.7. Higher-order discrimination and feel
- 5.8. The case for higher-order thought theory
- 6. Second (-order) steps towards a theory of consciousness
- 6.1. Theory 1: actual and conscious
- 6.2. Theory 2: actual and non-conscious
- 6.3. Theory 3: potential and non-conscious
- 6.4. Theory 4: potential and conscious
- 6.5. Dennett 1978: availability to print-out
- 6.6. Dennett 1991: multiple drafts and probes
- 6.7. Time and indeterminacy
- 6.8. Dennett on the place of language in thought
- 7. A reflexive thinking theory of consciousness
- 7.1. Reflexive thinking theory
- 7.2. Contrasts and advantages
- 7.3. Conscious versus non-conscious thinking
- 7.4. Objections and elucidations
- 7.5. The problem of unity
- 7.6. The problem of phenomenal feel
- 7.7. A Cartesian Theatre?
- 7.8. Animals and infants revisited
- 8. The involvement of language in conscious thinking
- 8.1. An architecture for human thinking
- 8.2. An evolutionary story
- 8.3. The argument from introspection revisited
- 8.4. Working memory and the central executive
- 8.5. The thesis of natural necessity (weak)
- 8.6. Objections and elucidations
- 8.7. The thesis of natural necessity (strong)
- 8.8. The scope and significance of NN
- Conclusion
- References
- Index